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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: AN 
OPPORTUNITY FOR THE RULE OF REASON 
Maria C. Holland* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 19691 (NEPA) pro-
vides federal administrative agencies2 with a framework within 
which to consider the environmental consequences of their ac-
tions. Under NEPA, a federal agency must prepare and submit 
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prior to the initiation 
of any action which could have a significant effect on the envi-
ronment.3 NEPA establishes a national policy "to promote efforts 
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment."4 
Litigation brought to enforce the procedural scheme delineated in 
the Act5 has shaped the form of compliance with this environmen-
tal protection policy.6 While the statute's policy language is 
* Managing Editor, BOSTON COILEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 
1 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. 
v 1981); (This statute was the first act signed into law in the decade of 1970's: President 
Richard M. Nixon signed the act to become effective January 1, 1970) [hereinafter 
referenced as NEPA]. 
2 Many states have also adopted statutes similar to NEPA announcing a comprehen-
sive environmental policy. NEPA, however, basically addresses federal agency actions, 
since private actions are necessarily limited by federal license and permit prescriptions. 
See Yost, 27 C.P.S. (BNA) The Environmental Impact Statement Process, Worksheet 9. (A 
synopsis of the existing state Environmental Impact Statement requirements.) 
3 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976). 
4 42 U.S.C. § 4221 (1976). 
5 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976) (The procedural requirement is the federal agency sub-
mission of an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"). The EIS is the action-forcing 
procedural mechanism specified in the Act which requires federal agencies to prepare an 
analytical statement of the environmental consequences of their proposed federal ac-
tion.). See infra text and notes at notes 223-353. 
6 J. HAGERTY AND J. HEER, ENVIRONMENTAL AssESSMENTS AND STATEMENTS (1977) 
§§ 3-6 [hereinafter cited as ASSESSMENTS AND STATEMENTS] (This work provides a good 
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broad,1 the Act designates specific procedural requirements for 
agencies to follow in their decision-making process.8 Through 
implementing NEPA, federal agencies have reached various and 
often contradictory results. Consequently, courts have been dele-
gated a substantial role in assessing the actual impact of the Act's 
substance and procedure upon federal agency conduct. 
Since the enactment of NEPA fourteen years ago, judicial in-
terpretation of the statute has shaped the impact of the Act. The 
first decade of NEPA litigation focused primarily, although not 
exclusively, upon agency responsibilities under the Act.9 In recent 
years, however, litigation under NEPA has focused more upon 
the nature and scope of the judiciary's role in enforcing NEPA 
and its relation to the administration agencies.10 The statute's 
loosely drafted language has produced a variety of judicial in-
terpretations. As a result, federal agencies have encountered 
problems complying with the judicially-construed mandates of 
NEPA. 
NEPA was created by the Congress as a "basic national charter 
for protection of the environment."ll The general purpose of the 
Act is to provide for the assurance of a "safe, healthful, productive 
and aesthetically and culturally pleasing"l~ environment for all 
Americans. The federal government is assigned the responsibility 
of implementing this policy goal.13 To accomplish this goal, NEPA 
charges federal agencies14 with the duty of observing certain 
overview of NEPA's legislative history and the integration of the judicial role necessary 
to the Act's implementation); L. LAKE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, ch. 6 (1982); M. 
BAKER, J. KAMING, R. MORRISON, Environmental Impact Statements: A Guide to Prep-
aration and Review (PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE 1977) [hereinafter cited as Baker, E [S 
Guide). 
7 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 
F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (This seminal case was the first judicial interpretation of 
NEPA by the D.C. Circuit. In his opening statement, J. Skelly Wright predicted the 
onslaught of litigation regarding environmental protection and ruled that agency rules 
governing consideration of environmental matters were to be held to a "strict standard 
of compliance"). [d. See also AsSESSMENTS AND STATEMENTS, supra note 6, at 91; Baker, 
EIS GmDE supra note 6, at 18. 
8 449 F.2d at 1112. 
9 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Group v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (NEPA mandate to agencies "essentially procedural"). 
10 See L. LAKE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1982) 95; Grazing Fields Farm v. 
Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068 (1st Cir. 1980). . 
11 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (1983). 
I~ 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2) (1976). 
13 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1976). 
14 Federal agencies, as representatives of specified standard of federal government 
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procedural requirements in the course of making agency deci-
sions.15 Failure by federal agencies to "use all means practicable"16 
to attain the goals of NEPA is redressable by those adversely 
affected through injunctive reliefY Public enforcement of the 
federal agencies' duty of compliance with the statute is a method 
of ensuring that the statute's policy will be realized in a manner 
beneficial to the American public. 
The sweeping nature of NEPA's policy statement has required 18 
that its ramifications be developed through decisional law. 19 Such 
broad statutory language essentially provides" a catalyst for de-
velopment of a 'common law' of NEPA."20 Some courts have 
adopted this interpretation of the Act in construing the provisions 
of NEPA/1 contributing to the development of the statute as an 
effective environmental protection tool. While this "common law 
of NEPA" has furnished federal administrative agencies with 
some standards for compliance, it has yet to supply the judiciary 
with a uniform standard or methodology of reviewing agency 
compliance with the Act. 
Federal courts have applied a variety of tests for assessing 
agency implementation of the Act's policies.22 Contributing to the 
confusion regarding the appropriate standard of judicial review is 
the inconsistency with which federal agencies have observed the 
procedural requirements of the Act. Without a coherent judicial 
definition of criteria for compliance with NEPA, agencies have 
been unable to develop a process of decision making which com-
ports with the environmental mandates of the Act. Lacking uni-
formity, federal agencies' implementation of a national environ-
mental policy will never be substantively achieved. 
are, therefore, required to exercise a responsibility as they specifically devise and im-
plement projects which directly affect the environment. 
15 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1976). 
16 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1976). 
17 See 1982 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: 13TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUAUTY (1983) 234. According to statistics issued by the Council on 
Environmental Quality (hereinafter cited as CEQ), there were 1,191 lawsuits against 
federal agencies based upon NEPA claims in the period between January 1, 1970 and 
December 31, 1979. 
18 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976). 
19 ASSESSMENTS AND STATEMENTS supra note 6, at 93. 
,0 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 421 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). 
21 See Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 965 (5th Cir. 1983); Village of False Pass v. 
Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123, 1149 (D. Alaska, 1983). 
" See LAKE, supra note at 104 (Lake suggests the discrepancy in review standards 
applied by the judiciary is rooted in the controversy about whether NEPA is a substan-
tive or procedural mandate). 
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Federal courts may be able to develop a consistent standard of 
judicial review by analogizing the provisions of NEPA to the 
common law concept of a charitable trust.:l3 A charitable trust is a 
fiduciary relationship24 established to provide a benefit to the 
community or a class of individuals rather than to an individual 
beneficiary.25 A comparison between NEPA and such a trust re-
veals similarities which could provide the judiciary with a com-
parative framework by which to analyze NEPA. 
Administration of the charitable trust is the duty owed by the 
trustee26 to a designated class of beneficiaries. The trustee must 
exercise this responsibility in order to effectuate the trust pur-
pose.27 Duties of the trustee include the exercise of reasonable 
care and skilp8 in the controp9 and the preservation30 of the trust 
property. In order to fulfill his obligation to the beneficiaries of the 
trust, the trustee must record and present to those beneficiaries 
an account of the trust administration.31 This principle of account-
ing is designed to provide an accurate and current reflection of 
the trust property status. Upon failure of the trustee to perform 
these duties, the trust may be enforced in equity32 by someone 
with a special interest in the trust or by a public officer.33 The 
provisions of NEPA are analogous to a charitable trust estab-
lished to preserve the integrity of the American environment for 
the "succeeding generations"34 of American citizens. 
Several courts have held that agency compliance with NEPA 
should be governed by the "rule of reason."35 Analogizing to this 
23 See infra text and notes at notes 46-123. 
"4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 348 (1959) [hereinafter cited as RESTATE-
MENT]. 
"5 [d. at § 364. 
26 [d. at § 379. 
27 [d. at § 379 comment a; see also § 170. 
2" [d. at § 379 comment a. 
"9 [d. at § 175. 
30 [d. at § 176. 
31 [d. at § 379; see also § 172. 
32 [d. at § 392. 
:J;j [d. at § 391. 
.34 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (1976). 
~, 449 F.2d at 112; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 
(D.C. Cir. 1972); International Harvester Co., Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 
1973); see also Leventhal,Environmental Decision-Making and the Role of the Courts, 122 
U. PA. L. REV. 509, 537-40 (1975). He suggests that the "rule of reason" should govern 
agency activity pursuant to NEPA. This standard is a stricter requirement for agency 
behavior than is that imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act which requires only 
that agency behavior adhere to a standard which is not "arbitrary and capricious." 5 
U.S.C. § 706(a) (1976). 
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charitable trust principle supports judicial application of a rea-
sonableness standard to review agency decision making under 
the statute. Under this analogy, the duties imposed upon federal 
agencies to protect the national environment are similar to the 
fiduciary duties of a trustee.36 NEPA imposes duties on federal 
agencies to account publicly for administrative decisions affecting 
the environment, much as a trustee must observe his duties of 
accounting to the beneficiaries of the trust.37 Using this analogy, 
the judiciary is provided with an ascertainable standard by which 
to assess agency conduct. In addition, this analogy to the trustee's 
accounting duties allows courts to use the statute's delineated 
accounting procedure - such as its consideration of alternative 
proposals - as a source for proper reflection of agency compliance 
with the Act. A common law interpretation of NEPA consistent 
with the Act's stated environmental policy is therefore possible 
through the use of the charitable trust analogy.38 
The environmental policy and procedural requirements of 
NEPA can be considered as parallel to the nature of a charitable 
trust instrument. A charitable trust allows a trustee to manage 
the trust property for a purpose beneficial to the public.39 NEPA 
creates a similar obligation for federal agencies. Congress im-
posed upon the federal government, through its federal agencies, 
the duty of promoting "efforts which will prevent or eliminate 
damage to the environment."40 To achieve this goal, the trustees 
must be held to the high standard of conduct arising from the 
fiduciary relationship between the trustee and the trust be-
neficiaries.41 Viewing the agency decision-making process from 
this perspective would permit the judiciary to scrutinize agency 
compliance with NEPA more closely. Through analogy to the 
trust principle the courts could analyze agency compliance with 
the Act by applying a consistent "reasonableness" standard. 
The problems inherent in judicial interpretation of NEPA are 
revealed in the review of the alternatives requirement of the 
EISY The EIS is the accounting procedure presented in the Act. 
36 See infra text and notes at notes 90-115. 
37 See infra text and notes at notes 107-15. 
38 See infra text and notes at notes 46-123. 
39 Supra note 24, at § 348. 
40 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976). 
41 Supra note 24, at § 2 comment b, § 170; A.W. SCOTl', ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS §§ 2.5, 170 (1960) [hereinafter cited as SCOTl'J. 
4~ 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(iii) (1976). 
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One of its purposes is to reflect agency discussion of the alterna-
tives explored by the agency in its decision-making process.43 
However, varying judicial interpretations of this requirement 
have generated different standards of judicial review as well as 
an incoherent standard for agency performance.44 Achievement of 
NEPA's fundamental policies will be more readily accomplished if 
the judicial role is performed in a consistent manner - possible 
through this analogy to the charitable trust. As one court com-
mented: "NEPA thus provides a means by which the ultimate 
owners of the land - the citizens - may inform their trustee -
the government - of their approval or disapproval of the pro-
posed actions."45 
This Article will outline the basic trust principles and the statu-
tory elements relevant to the analogy of the charitable trust 
doctrine. It will then examine the possibility of resolving the 
inconsistency of judicial perspective of NEPA through this anal-
ogy. Section II encapsulates the policy and components of the 
charitable trust doctrine. Section III then presents NEPA's policy 
and its mandate to the agencies as interpreted by the judiciary. 
The Article then addresses the EIS as the statute's "action-
·forcing" mechanism, and explores many parallels to the charita-
ble trust doctrine. Fourth, a specific EIS requirement-that fed-
eral agencies consider alternatives-will be examined against a 
backdrop of judicial inconsistency. This Article will then propose 
changes in the statutory framework ofNEPA which could enable 
the disparity to be resolved. This Article will conclude that the 
courts have the authority to demand more than pro forma com-
pliance with NEPA. Applying principles of the common law 
charitable trust doctrine to the statute would infuse NEPA with 
the vitality and force necessary to the accomplishment of the 
NEPA environmental policy goal. 
II. PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARITABLE TRUST DOCTRINE 
The trust is a "fiduciary relationship in which one person is the 
holder of the title to property subject to an equitable obligation to 
keep or use the property for the benefit of another."46 It is a legal 
43 [d. 
44 See e.g., discussion infra at text and notes at notes 258-65. 
4'; California v. Bergland, 13 ERC 2225 (1975). 
46 REST., supra note 24, at § 2. 
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relationship created at common law to effectuate various meth-
ods of property dispositionY As a fiexible 48 legal device, the trust 
is governed by equitable principles49 and has few specific legal 
constraints. Certain specific elements must be present before a 
disposition of property qualifies as a trust: there must be a trust 
property,50 a trustee51, and a beneficiary.52 
The trust is created with the specific intent that a trust rela-
tionship arise.53 Creation of the trust originates with a "settlor"54 
who manifests an intent to develop a trust and satisfies the 
requisite formalities in the creation process.55 These formalities 
include designation of the trust elements, a description of the 
trust property, the appointment of a trustee to administer the 
trust, and the designation of the beneficiaries of the trust.56 The 
trust relationship permits the owner of property to alienate the 
benefits of ownership from the burdens associated with such a 
possessory interest.57 This is accomplished through the mecha-
nism of trustee management of the corpus. The corpus is man-
aged to achieve the trust purpose as it affects the beneficiary .58 
Service of the beneficiaries' interest in the trust property remains 
the constant duty of the trustee.59 Settlor articulation of the trust 
goal is necessary to provide guidance for the trustee. The trustee 
must have some evidence as to what is required to properly 
administer and achieve the trust.60 A clear understanding of the 
settlor's intent is necessary to permit the trustee to effect the 
purpose of the trust. 
47 Id. at § 2 comment c. 
48 SCO'IT, supm note 41, at § 2.2. 
49 REST., supra note 24, at § 197; SCO'IT, supra note 41, at § 12.3. 
50 REST., supra note 24, at § 3(2); SCO'IT, supra note 41, at § 1. 
51 REST., supra note 24, at § 3(3). 
" Id. at § 3(4); SCO'IT, supra note 41, at § 3.2. 
53 REST., supra note 24, at § 23. 
04 REST., supra note 24, at §§ 3(1), 18. The settlor is that person or entity with legal 
control over and interest in the trust property and is free to determine its disposition. 
55 See generally REST., supra note 24, at §§ 23-52, 16B; for specific instances, see SCOTT, 
supra note 41, at § 24.2. 
5R REST., supm note 24, at § 76; see also SCOTT, supm note 41, at § 76. 
57 SCO'IT, supra note 41, at § 1. 
58 REST., supra note 24, at § 164; SCO'IT, supra note 41, at § 164.1. 
59 SCO'IT, supm note 41, at § 348. 
60 SCO'IT, supra note 41, at § 123(3). 
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A. The Charitable Trust 
The charitable trust6! must be created to serve a public purpose, 
rather than the interest of specific individuals.62 A charitable 
purpose is generally defined as any "purpose that is beneficial to 
the community."63 A substantial societal interest is required to 
qualify as a valid charitable trust purpose.64 The Restatement 
(second) of Trusts takes the position that a purpose can be viewed 
as charitable if its attainment will be of such social value to justify 
the duration of property in perpetuity to this end.65 Legitimate 
goals of a charitable trust include the advancement of religion,66 
the promotion of health,67 education,68 the relief of poverty,69 the 
construction of public buildings and highways,1° as well as conser-
vation of natural resources.71 A trust created to benefit the nation, 
a state, or municipality is considered to have a charitable pur-
pose.72 Improvement of the structure and methods of government 
also qualifies as a valid charitable purpose.73 Occasionally the 
charitable trust has been referred to as a "governmental"74 trust 
because it provides citizens with advantages more commonly 
supplied by national, state, or local governments.75 Due to the 
amorphous nature of such governmental purposes "beneficial to 
1\1 REST., supra note 24, at § 348. 
6' SCOTT, supra note 41, at §§ 348.3, 364. 
6:< Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel, A.C. 531, 583 (1891); 
REST., supra note 24, at § 368 comment f. 
64 REST., supra note 24, at § 368(0. 
65 [d. at § 368 comment b. 
66 [d. at § 368(c). 
61 [d. at § 368(d). 
68 [d. at § 368(b). 
69 [d. at § 368(a). 
10 SCOTT, supra note 41, at § 368. 
11 REST., supra note 24, at § 374, comment f. 
l' REST., supra note 24, at § 374, comment j. 
13 [d. at §§ 373-374; see also SCOTT, supra note 41, at § 368. 
14 In fact, the United States may administer a charitable trust if the purpose of such 
trust intertwines with the powers conferred upon the federal government by the Con-
stitution. SCOTT, supra note 41, at § 378. 
15 [d. at §§ 365,401. Even though the rule of perpetuities limits trust instruments to 21 
years in length, a charitable trust may continue beyond this time limit. The trust may 
continue as long as the certain state of affairs contemplated by the settlor continues to 
exist. 
The NEPA statute, in Section 101(b)(1) (42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (1976)) essentially recog-
nizes the responsibility "of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding 
generations." This duty is imposed based upon an assumption that the governmental 
structure existing in 1970 will continue. 
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the community," the charitable trust may endure for an in-
definite or unlimited time.76 
Consistent with the purpose, the charitable trust must be 
created for the benefit of a class of beneficiaries.77 Individuals 
within that class, however, must not be designated to receive the 
benefit of the trust.78 The requirement of indefinite beneficiaries 
within a more precisely prescribed class is designed to promote 
the charitable trust goal of delivering a social benefit to the 
public.79 Identifying members of a certain class as the recipients of 
the trust profit affords the trust the opportunity to serve the 
interests of successive generations of this class of beneficiaries.so 
Charitable trust provisions have been liberally construed in 
order to allow the goals of the settlor to be fulfilled.8! No specific 
language is required for the formation of a charitable trust.8~ All 
that is required is a manifestation of intent that the trust prop-
erty be used for a certain charitable purpose and be accompanied 
by enforceable duties designed to achieve that purpose.83 The 
trustee charged with administration of the charitable trust is 
expected to exercise reasonably the duties and powers necessary 
to ensure that the charitable purpose of the trust is achieved. 
These duties accompanying the charitable trust were once en-
forceable in equity84 only by the State Attorney General as the 
representative of interest of the public.85 
Under modern statutory law, however, the trend has been to 
expand the range of persons legally capable of enforcing the 
purpose of the trust through injunctive relief.86 Beneficiaries with 
76 Seon, supra note 41, at § 365. 
77 REST., supra note 24, at § 375. 
78 Seon, supra note 41, at § 375.2. 
79 ld. at § 375. 
80 ld. 
81 First Bank & Trust Co. v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 796,359 N.E.2d 938 (1977). 
82 Seon, supra note 41, at § 351. 
83 REST., supra note 24, at § 351. 
84 ld. at § 391. 
85 ld. at § 391. 
8" G.G. BOGERT AND G.T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS, (5th ed. (1973» 
401-43; see WISe. STAT. ANN. §§ 701-10 (West, 1971). This is analogous to the expanded 
theory of standing in environmental cases. 
An important contributing factor to the number of cases arising under NEPA is the 
liberalized standing requirements in environmental suits brought under federal stat-
utes. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), the Supreme Court enunciated the 
elements necessary to confer standing in cases brought by persons alleging injury "of a 
non-economic nature to interests that are widely shared." ld. at 734. The Court stated 
that the plaintiff must suffer "injury in fact" and also be within "the zone of interests to 
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a "special interest in the enforcement of the trust"87 are regarded 
as proper plaintiffs, in addition to the Attorney General, for en-
forcing the terms of the trust. Thus, the beneficiaries of a charita-
ble trust may bring suit against the trustee for any interference 
with his entitlement to trust benefits. In order to have standing to 
sue, however, a beneficiary with a "special interest" in the trust 
must demonstrate that his interest has been adversely affected 
by the trustee's inappropriate administration of the trust.88 Alle-
gations of damage caused to the public generally are insufficient to 
support a claim of standing.89 
B. Fiduciary Responsibilities of the Trustee in Administering the 
Trust 
The trustee incurs certain duties and obligations to administer 
the trust on behalf of the beneficiary.90 The extent of these duties 
and powers is established by the terms of the trust.91 Under both 
charitable and private trust law,9~ the trustee owes a high duty of 
management responsibility to the beneficiary.93 The trustee's ob-
ligation to exercise his discretion over the trust property to fur-
ther the interests of the beneficiary is fundamental to the trust 
relationship.94 A fiduciary standard of integrity must accompany 
the trustee's assumption of duties due to her relatively unfettered 
be protected or regulated by the statute." Id. at 733. Once the particular plaintiff has 
established an interest in the outcome of the suit, she is entitled to assert the interest of 
the public generally. Id. at 740 n.15. 
This expanded notion of standing in environmental cases in conjunction with the 
broad policy mandate of NEPA reflects a recognition of a legally enforceable public 
interest in the fate of the American environment. NEPA itself does not confer a grant of 
standing, nor does it contain a remedial scheme to enforce its substantive and pro-
cedural dictates. A broad class of citizens, however, are provided the opportunity to hold 
the federal government accountable for its actions affecting the environment through 
implementation of standing criteria announced in Sierra Club. See L. RODGERS, HAND-
BOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1977); F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 
9.126.3 (1978); Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, (E.!. DOLGIN & T.G.P. GUILBERT, 
eds., 1974) 283-86; Sierra Club v: Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); United States v. SCRAP 
(SCRAP I), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
S7 Id. at § 391. 
ss Id. at § 391. 
K9 SCOTT, supra note 41, at § 391. 
!J{) SCOTT, supra note 41, at §§ 2.4, 2.5. 
HI SCOTT, supra note 41, at § 164 . 
• , SCOTT, supra note 41, at § 379. 
93 BOGERT, supra note 86, at 343-44. 
"I BOGERT, supra note 86, at 343-44; see SCOTT, supra note 41, at § 2.5. 
1985] NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 753 
management of the trust property.9S The trustee must exercise 
these duties in a fashion concomitant with the espoused trust 
purpose. 
1. Duties of Loyalty and Due Care 
Inherent in the trustee's fiduciary responsibilities is a duty of 
loyalty to the beneficiary.96 The trustee may not allow self-interest 
to interfere with the administration of the trust in a manner 
detrimental to the beneficiary's interest.97 This duty of loyalty 
also restricts the trustee's ability to delegate certain administra-
tive duties without the consent of the beneficiary.98 Loyalty to the 
beneficiaries' interests requires reasonable administration.99 
The trustee, in performing his administrative duties, must 
exercise the care of a reasonably prudent trustee in similar cir-
cumstancesYlO The trustee is obligated to treat the beneficiary's 
interests with the same level of care that he would exercise on his 
own behalf. lOt The trustee must exercise reasonable prudence and 
skill102 in conducting affairs relevant to the protection and preser-
vation ofthe trust property lO3 and promote the best interest of the 
beneficiary in fulfilling the purposes of the trust.104 The terms of 
the trust are deemed to confer implicitly upon the trustee the 
powers necessary and appropriate to fulfill the designated pur-
pose of the trust. lOS The discretion afforded the trustee is limited 
by the parameters of good faith and reasonable judgment.too 
2. Duty of Accounting 
Since the trustee is charged with a high degree of control over 
the beneficiary's equitable interest in the COrpUS,107 the common 
law of trusts has adopted an accounting process as a safeguard to 
95 REST., supra note 24, at § 186. 
96 Id. 
97 SCOTT, supra note 41, at § 170. 
98 REST., supra note 24, at § 171. 
99 Id. at § 2.5. 
100 Id. at § 174; SCOTT, supra note 41, at §174. 
101 REST., supra note 24, at § 174; SCOTT, supra note 41, at § 174. 
10"2 REST., supra note 24, at § 174. 
103 Id. at § 176. 
104 I d. at § 186. 
105 Id. 
106 SCOTT, supra note 41, at § 187. 
107 BOGERT, supra note 86, at 4. 
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oversee the trustee in the exercise of his duties. The trustee is 
charged with the duty to keep account of the trust management108 
and to disclose all relevant information respecting the adminis-
tration of the trust to the beneficiariesY)!) Accountability of the 
trustee serves two purposes: 1) to acquaint the beneficial owners 
of the corpus with the productivity of the corpus as it affects their 
interest; 110 and 2) to prevent the trustee from abusing these inter-
ests by failing to provide some record of the trust administra-
tion.11l 
The beneficiaries are entitled to request from the trustee any 
accounts and additional information pertinent to the trust admin-
istration.ll~ Failure by the trustee to render such an accounting 
creates a presumption against the proper performance of his 
duties. II:1 Refusal to disclose information concerning the trust 
account is sufficient cause for the trustee's removal.114 Reviewing 
courts generally use a standard of management to assess the 
records of the trustee's judgment in managing the trustY5 
3. Remedies for Inappropriate Trust Administration 
Although as holder of legal title to the trust property the 
trustee has the discretion to exercise any powers he deems neces-
sary to fulfill the purpose of the trust, an unreasonable extension 
of this privilege is considered a breach of trustY6 Any beneficiary 
of a trust, including one with only a future interest in the trust,1l7 
is entitled to maintain a suit against the trustee to enforce the 
trust or to obtain redress for its breach.1l8 Violation by the trustee 
of any of his duties under the relationship constitutes a breach of 
trust,llfl and renders the trustee liable to the beneficiary.I~() The 
equitable remedies available to a beneficiary for a breach of 
lOH REST., supra note 24, at § 172; see also SCOTT, supra note 41, at § 172. 
10!! REST., supra note 24, at § 173; see also SCOTT, supra note 41, at Trusts § 173. 
110 SCOTT, supra note 41, at § 172. 
II'Id. 
11' REST., supra note 24, at § 173. 
II:; SCOTT, supra note 41, at § 172. 
'" Id. at § 172. 
11.-, Id. at § 187.2. 
III; Id. at § 185A. 
117 Id. at § 200. 
IIH REST., supra note 24, at § 200. 
"" Id. at § 201. 
'''' See SCOTT, supra note 41, at § 200. 
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trust1~1 include: 1) specific enforcement of the trustee's duties; 2) 
redress for breach of the trust; 3) an injunction against the immi-
nent breach of trust; and 4) removal of the trustee.l~~ 
The trustee must exercise integrity in the trust property man-
agement in order to withstand scrutiny based upon an assess-
ment of "reasonableness." Such a standard is appropriate in light 
of the trustee's discretion over property of the beneficiary.1~3 The 
role of the trustee is to fulfill the purpose of the trust in a manner 
beneficial to the equitable owner of the trust property. Trust law 
imposes such high standards of behavior on trustees to ensure 
that the goal of the trust will be attained. The availability of such 
injunctive relief as a measure to enforce the trust purpose reflects 
the importance of property and its appropriate disposition in 
American common law. 
III. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POllCY ACT 
Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) in recognition of the need for appropriate treatment of 
America's natural resources.1~4 The statute itself acknowledges 
the federal government's continuing role as trustee of the Amer-
ican environment1:]',) and declares "each generation as trustee of 
the environment for succeeding generations."1~6 Congress, empo-
wered with a legal interest in the American "human environ-
ment,"1~7 intended for NEPA to guide the federal government in 
the achievement of environmental protection. 
Congress has the legal authority to determine how the public 
lands in the United States should be used. This authority is 
conferred upon the Congress through the Property Clause of the 
United States Constitution.1~8 The Property Clause vests Con-
gress with the authority to make "needful Rules and Regula-
'"' Remedies in equity are available to the beneficiaries of the trust since historically 
the courts of equity had jurisdiction over trust administration. SCOTT, supra note 41, at § 
197. 
'"" REST., at § 201. 
U3 See supra text and notes at notes 100-06. 
,", According to th~ BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE 
INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 1980, there are 2.2 billion acres of land within the 
United States of which approximately 113 (or 738 million acres) are the responsibility of 
the federal government. 
u, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331(a)(b) (1976). 
'"" 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (1976). 
m 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) {1976). 
'"" U.S. CONSTITUTION, Art. IV. § 3, c1.2. 
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tions" "respecting" federal property.l29 Some commentators advo-
cate limiting the scope of the property power to protection of the 
land owned by the United States government.130 In bequeathing 
Congress with an open-ended authority to promulgate such 
"needful Rules and Regulations," however, flexibility with regard 
to the scope of these rules is demanded as the country develops in 
a manner beyond the capacity of the Framers to foresee.l31 
NEPA is among those "needful Rules and Regulations" within 
congressional power to promulgate in the effort to implement an 
effective environmental policy. Through NEPA, Congress can be 
viewed as the settlor and federal agencies as the trustee. Thus, it 
can be argued that federal agencies exercise their responsibility 
as trustee of the American environment for the benefit of "pre-
sent and future generations of Americans."132 
A. NEPA Purpose 
During the mid to late 1960's, Congress became increasingly 
aware of the need to preserve the environment. l33 Congressional 
efforts to draft legislation during this time were designed "to 
reverse what seems to be a clear and intensifying trend toward 
environmental degradation."I34 In addition to its general desire to 
abate environmental harm, Congress was concerned with the lack 
1'9 Id. 
1"0 Frank & Eckhard, Power of Congress Under the Property Clause to Give Extrater-
ritorial Effect to Federal Lands Law: Will 'Respecting Property' Go the Way of'Affecting 
Commerce'?, 15 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 663, 682-83 (1983). 
1.31 In Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976), the Supreme Court, while 
discussing the limitations on state and federal authority over public lands, reaffirmed an 
expansive reading of the Property Clause. 
I", 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976). 
I"" N.Y. Times, May 3, 1969, at A34, col. 2; BAKER, supra note 6, at 7. 
131 H.R. REP. NO. 91-378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 2751, 2753. The enactment of NEPA was also prompted by the recognition 
that modern technology was advancing faster than society's ability to contain the 
adverse consequences ensuing from this growth. NEPA was viewed as a potential 
control on federal agencies' infatuation with this advanced technology. This aspect of 
NEPA has not always been considered in a manner consistent with the underlying 
purpose of the Act as a whole. Rather, it led many agencies to adopt a lenient attitude 
toward risks that inevitably accompany "the mixed blessings of progress." In determin-
ing procedural compliance under NEPA, the envisioned containment of technological 
threats has not always been achieved. See Lesser, Putting Bite in NEPA's Bark: New 
Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for the Preparation of Environmental 
Impact Statements, 13 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 367, 369 (1979-80); opening remarks of Judge 
Newman in his opinion in the City of New York V. United States Department of Trans-
portation, 715 F.2d 732, 736 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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of environmental awareness of many federal agencies, whose 
policies were often in conflict with "the general public interest."I3.'; 
Prior to the enactment of NEPA, the failure by many federal 
agencies to give careful consideration to the environmental im-
pact of their actions was challenged by parties seeking to infuse 
the agency decision-making process with a sense of public concern 
for the environment. I:l6 As a result of these concerns, Congress in 
1969 enacted the National Environmental Policy Act, the purpose 
of which was to hold the federal government accountable as 
trustee for the protection of the American environment. 137 
NEPA was conceived as an environmental policy dictate l38 to 
the federal government in response to the burgeoning public 
concern for the integrity of the environment.139 In an effort to 
provide a comprehensive policy mandate to govern federal agency 
activities,140 in all of their various forms, Congress drafted NEPA 
in broad language.14l Section 101 of the statute proclaims Con-
gress' goal of creating an environmental protection policy to be-
nefit the American public, present and future. 142 This section 
declares that it is the federal government's national environmen-
tal policy 
to use all practicable means and measures, including finan-
cial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster 
and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in product-
ive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other re-
quirements of present and future generations of Amer-
icans.143 
The Act further states that the government's duty to protect the 
13" 1969 U.S. Code Congo & Ad. News 1753-54. 
136 See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 
(2d Cir. 1965); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. V. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
137 "NEPA's most basic purpose is providing Federal accountability for the environ-
ment." S. REP. No. 94-52, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 859, 865. See supra text and notes at notes 90-115. 
138 See S. REP. No. 94-52, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975). (For a more cynical view of the 
basis for NEPA's passage, see LAKE, supra note 10, at 39, in which shoe contends that 
NEPA was merely a "symbolic gesture" made by Congress in 1969.) 
139 See generally, R. ODELL, ENVIRONMENTAL AWAKENING (1980), (see specifically 
Senator Edmund Muskie's foreword to this compilation of monthly reports issued by the 
Conservation Foundation, addressing environmental issues). See also Lake, The Envi-
ronmental Mandate: Activists and the Electorate, 98 POL. SCI. Q. 215 (1983). 
140 ASSESSMENTS AND STATEMENTS, supra note 6, at 291. 
141 I d. at 91. 
142 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976). 
143 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976). 
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American environment includes responsibility for preserving the 
environment for future generations. l44 
Section 102 outlines a procedural mechanism designed to im-
plement this policy of environmental protection. l 4.'; This section of 
the statute imposes upon all federal agencies a duty to account for 
their implementation of the policy of the Act. l46 The EIS must be 
composed of specific elements reflecting the agency decision-mak-
ing process.147 If properly prepared and presented, the EIS should 
provide the public with a proper record of an agency's diligence in 
reviewing effects on the environment. 
Administrative agencies of the federal government are often 
charged with particular responsibilities which are inconsistent 
with the goal of environmental preservation. l48 For example, the 
Department of Transportation (DOT)l49 must design and super-
vise the construction of an interstate highway system which, by 
its physical nature, necessarily has an impact upon the environ-
ment. With the implementation of NEPA, federal agencies, such 
as DOT, must consider the environmental consequences of any 
proposed agency-sponsored action.150 The Environmental Impact 
Statement process set forth in Section 102 enumerates specific 
procedural guidelines which agencies must observe in assessing 
environmental factors throughout the decision-making process. 
The EIS requirement provides an accounting record for the public 
of the agencies' consideration of the environmental consequences 
of their actions. Such a requirement is reminiscent of the account-
ing the trustee must render to the beneficiaries of a trust.151 
Section 103 of the Act establishes the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ).15~ The CEQ was created to oversee federal agency 
implementation of NEPA and to provide recommendations on 
environmental matters to the Executive Office ofthe President.153 
144 Id. at § 4331 (1976). 
14" 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976). See infra text and notes at notes 223-353. 
146 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(l) and (2) (1976). 
147 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(iii) (1976). 
146 See generally, Leventhal, Environmental Decision-making and the Role of the 
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1975). 
149 See, L. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT (1982) (DOT funded 
projects comprised the most numerous public works involved in environmental litiga-
tion.) Id. at 85-86. 
150 See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980). 
151 See supra text and notes at notes 107-15. 
15' 82 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1976). 
153 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1976). 
1985] NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 759 
The CEQ is responsible for the promulgation of regulations to 
implement the procedural provisions of NEPA.154 For the most 
part, the CEQ has viewed its primary responsibility as that of an 
advisor to the President on environmental matters.155 Under Sec-
tion 103, the CEQ must issue an annual report of the environmen-
tal programs and policies of the federal government in an effort to 
distribute information to the American public about the envi-
ronment.156 Due to the broad language of the Act, however, the 
position of the CEQ as a dependent agency in the Executive Office 
affords an opportunity for executive influence upon the CEQ in its 
annual presentation of the environmental position of the federal 
government. 157 
Due to the "vague"158 wording of NEPA the judiciary has been 
called upon to delineate the actual impact of the Act upon the 
conduct of federal administrative agencies. Despite Congress' in-
tent to vest the CEQ with this oversight function, the task of 
construing and enforcing the provisions of NEPA has been left 
primarily to the judiciary.159 
B. The Evolution of the NEPA Mandate to Administrative 
Agencies 
Since the enactment of NEPA in 1969, numerous suitsl60 have 
been instituted in an effort to determine the scope of the Act's 
substantive and procedural requirements.161 Judicial refinement 
and interpretation of NEPA has played an essential role in de-
154 40 C.F.R. § 1504; see Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979). 
155 Arnold, The Substantive Right to Environmental Quality Under the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act, 3 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 50028 (1973). Due to its perception of its role, 
CEQ has been viewed by some commentators as overshadowed by the judiciary as "the 
most effective instrumentality for assuring the implementation of NEPA." 
156 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1976). 
151 See Lesser, supra note 134, n.21. Although signed into law as the first act of the 
1970's by President Nixon, the administration fundamentally opposed the measure. It 
has been possible that an effort to maintain control over the environmental affairs as 
they affected government was accomplished through emasculation of a NEPA oversight 
body. As a dependent agency, CEQ does not wield the power necessary to enforce the 
NEPA mandate authoritatively. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979). 
158 AssESSMENTS AND STATEMENTS, supra note 6, at 91. 
159 Liroff, The Council on Environmental Quality, 3 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 50051 (1973). 
160 According to statistics issued by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) there 
were 1,191 lawsuits filed against federal government agencies under NEPA between 
1970 and 1980. See 1982 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: 13TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 234 (1983) (see discussion of The CEQ mission 
and authority, supra text and notes at notes 152-57). 
161 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1983). 
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termining the specific duties of federal agencies to consider the 
environmental impact of their actions in the agency decision-
making process.16:! Judicial decisions construing the provisions of 
NEPA have emphasized the "twin aims"163 of the statute: 1) to 
provide the public with complete and accurate information about 
significant environmental consequences of agency actions; and 2) 
to ensure that federal agencies give these environmental conse-
quences appropriate consideration in their decision-making pro-
cess.164 
Some commentators have suggested that the primary purpose 
of NEPA is to open the federal agency administrative process to 
the public.16s Yet, there is no specific reference in NEPA itself for 
public participation in the process.166 In spite of statutory silence 
on this issue, the regulations promulgated by the CEQ and the 
procedural mechanism set forth in the statute clearly con-
template public scrutiny of agency decision making which has an 
impact upon the environment.167 While some courts have recog-
nized the statute as a "full-disclosure law,"168 confusion over the 
importance of public scrutiny of agency behavior has led most 
courts to focus more upon agency consideration of the environ-
mental impact of the proposed administrative action. 
1. Consideration of Environmental Consequences in the Agency 
Decision-making Process 
Many judicial decisions under NEP A have focused on the na-
ture of agency responsibility for procedural compliance with the 
statuteY19 Section 102 of the Act imposes a high level of analysis in 
16" ASSESSMENTS AND STATEMENTS, supra note 6, at 3-6; LAKE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION, supra note 10, at ch.6. 
16" Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. et al. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 51 
U.S.L.W. 4678, 4680 (U.S. June 6, 1983). 
164 Action for Rational Transit v. West Side Highway, 536 F. Supp.1225, 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982); Vermont Yankee Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 
(1978); Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068 (1st Cir. 1980); 1-291 Why? 
Association v. Burns, 517 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1975); Chelsea Neighborhood Association v. 
U.S. Postal Service, 516 F.2d 378(2d Cir.1975); Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. 
v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972). 
165 See Lesser, supra note 134, at 370; CoIl\.ment, The NEPA and Energy Legislation: 
The Preemption of Judicial Review, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 403, 405 (1980); McGerity, The 
Courts, The Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEX. L. REV. 801, 806-07 (1977). 
166 LAKE, supra note 10, at 96. 
167 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.2(d), 1503.l(a)(3) (1983). 
''''' Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 
(E.D. Ark. 1971), affd 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). 
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the agency selection of a final course of action for a particular 
project. Agency officials are required to take a good faith "hard 
look"170 at the adverse environmental impact of the proposed 
action 171 before deciding how to best accomplish the desired result. 
The agency must then decide whether the proposed agency action 
and its consequences are consistent with public interest or 
whether it should adopt an alternative method of achieving the 
intended goal. 172 To effectuate the trust purpose of environmental 
preservation, the agency official must consider the environmental 
consequences of agency action. 
The goal of this environmental consideration provision is to 
require that agencies evaluate the environmental consequences 
of their actions early enough in the decision-making process to 
have an actual impact on the decision.173 An evaluation of envi-
169 See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
170 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); see also, National 
Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
There is judicial and academic confusion about whether the precise nature of the 
"hard look" doctrine is a judicial or administrative requirement. The late Judge Leven-
thal of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, widely respected for 
his analysis of the role of the judiciary vis-a-vis administrative agencies, originally 
articulated the doctrine. This view was earlier adopted in Greater Boston Television 
Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and Pike's 
Peak Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 422 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cen. 
denied, 395 U.S. 979 (1969). Judge Leventhal presented the doctrine as the responsibility 
of an administrative agency in its decision-making process. Under his view the agency 
must take a "hard look" in the examination of any salient problems encountered in 
implementing its statutory mandate. This should evince reasoned decision-making in 
regard to a specific agency action. 
A few years later Judge Leventhal presented the "hard look" as inherent in the 
judicial review of administrative rule making. Maryland National Capital Park and 
Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Service, 487 F.2d 1029, 1037-38 and n.4 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973). This evolution of the hard look doctrine has been especially applied to cases 
arising under NEPA. See 435 U.S. 519 (1978); International Rarvestor Co. v. Ruckels-
haus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
The judiciary takes a hard look to insure that the agencies have scrutinized the project 
as well. There are three elements comprising a court's "hard look" at agency decision 
making. Initially, the court must consult the governing statute to insure that the agency 
is complying with the substantive mandate. The court should then examine the pro-
cedural method of guaranteeing fairness in the agency decision-making process. Finally, 
the court focuses on the discretion in decision making exercised by the agency. The goal 
of this doctrine is to insure that there is evidence of reasoned decision making as the 
emphasized goal. Consequently, the agency must be able to explain through the ad-
ministrative record why a particular course of action was adopted over another proposal. 
Through this hard look analysis the court attempts to insure agency fulfillment of its 
designated mission. 
171 See City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 670 n.12 (9th Cir. 1975). 
m Delaware Water Emergency Group v. RansIer, 536 F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
17.3 Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 953 (1st Cir. 1983). 
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ronmental consequences is likely to be effective only if the evalua-
tion is made before alternative actions have been effectively forec-
losed and before the agency has committed itself to a course of 
action.174 The early timing of environmental commentary neces-
sarily requires the inclusion of forecasting and reasonable specu-
lation in the decision-making process.175 As a result, federal agen-
cies charged with noncompliance often assert that damage to the 
environment caused by their action was impossible to predict 
accurately.176 
This requirement for agencies to consider the environmental 
effects of their actions does not mean that these concerns alone 
must control the agency's selection of a final course of action. For 
example, in Stryckers Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen,177 the 
plaintiffs challenged under NEPA an urban renewal plan devised 
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
designating a site for low income housing in a wealthy neigh-
borhood. The Supreme· Court held that federal agencies were 
required only to "consider" the environmental consequences of 
any proposed action, and did not have to base their decision solely 
on environmental preference.178 The Court stated that the goal of 
NEPA was to insure well-informed and well-considered agency 
action.179 According to the Court, once the agency considers the 
environmental impact of its project, it does not necessarily have 
to elevate its environmental determinations above the other fac-
tors pertinent to its final decision. ISO 
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Karlen, federal courts 
had offered conflicting interpretations of the weight to be ac-
corded environmental factors in the decision-making process.1S1 It 
is now well established that NEPA was not intended to preclude 
all federal actions which may have adverse environmental conse-
174 RODGERS, supra note 86, at § 7.7,767. 
175 Scientists' Institutes for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission, 
481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
176 Id. at 1092. 
177 444 U.S. 223 (1980). 
178 Id. at 227. 
179Id. 
180 Id. at 227-28. 
181 See supra note 165, at 418 (1980); see also Leventhal, supra note 35. (Leventhal 
wrote that "environmental factors must serve as significant inputs to governmental 
policy and must be weighed heavily in the decisional balances. It is the function of review 
under NEPA to ensure that this purpose is served"). Id. at 515. 
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quences.182 NEPA was designed to have equal applicability to 
agencies with various and often divergent missions. l83 Each 
agency was created for a particular purpose.184 In analyzing vari-
ous methods of accomplishing their goals, agency decision-makers 
must balance a variety of elements; the environmental element is 
only one of many competing factors. Agencies, similar to trustees, 
must make decisions to provide the greatest benefit to the public. 
This responsibility may be achieved through a variety of methods. 
NEP A thus permits agencies to select a course of action with a 
less desirable environmental impact in order to satisfy a goal 
important to the public interest.l85 While the balancing of various 
national interests is a subjective process/86 a federal agency is 
nonetheless required to comply with the NEPA mandate of con-
sidering in good faith the environmental consequences of its ac-
tions in performing its agency function.187 Otherwise, judicial to-
lerance of mere pro fo'Y"'YIW compliance with this requirement 
would have the potential effect of undermining the fundamental 
environmental policy of the Act.188 
Agency foresight of environmental consequences is a necessary 
component of a reasoned decision-making process. In this respect 
NEPA requires the agency to act ina manner consistent with the 
duties of a trustee. l89 Commensurate with the standard of reason-
able prudence,190 which the trustee must exercise, are the stan-
dards for agency behavior within the statute itself. While the 
182 Delaware Water Emergency Group v. Ransier, 536 F. Supp. 26, 44 (E.D. Pa. 1981); 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d at 952. 
183 S. REP. No. 94-52, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 859, 865. See also Leventhal, supra note 35. 
184 Leventhal, supra note :55, at 509. 
1115 Commonwealth of Massachusetts V. Watt, 716 F.2d at 952. 
186 See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee V. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 
at 1123 (NEPA mandates case-by-case balancing judgment on the part of federal agen-
cies). 
187 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico V. Muskie, 507 F. Supp. 1035, 1055 CD. Puerto Rico 
1981) (additional good faith); 449 F.2d at 1112-13. 
188 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. V. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. 
Miss. 1972). The difficulty in ascertaining the degree to which a federal agency has 
actually given adequate attention to the substantive concerns about the nation's envi-
ronment was recognized by the legislature in its discussion of the contemplated bill. 
Discussion focused on the statute's compliance standard of "to the fullest extent possi-
ble." The legislators were concerned about agency circumvention of their duties under 
NEPA because of the broad meaning of these words. 1969 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
2751,2770. 
189 See supra text and notes at notes 90-115. 
190 See supra text and notes at note 100. 
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federal government is responsible for "restoring and maintaining 
environmental quality,"191 it must exercise this duty within the 
bounds of "all practicable means."19"l Such an obligation to conduct 
the agency affairs reasonably in light of environmental consid-
erations is analgous to the fiduciary duties owed by the trustee in 
maintaining the trust in the best interest of the beneficiary.193 
2. NEPA: Substance or Procedure? 
NEPA's effectiveness in promoting environmentally sound 
agency decision-making depends in large part upon whether 
courts view the Act as a substantive or procedural mandate.194 
Judicial interpretation of this question remains unsettled. This 
lack of judicial consensus195 concerning the nature of the Act's 
provisionsl96 has impeded the ability offederal agencies to develop 
effective methods of compliance.197 Some courts have held that 
merely perfunctory satisfaction of the procedures outlined in Sec-
tion 102 is insufficient.198 Yet the Supreme Court, in Vermont 
Yankee Power Group, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,199 found that "NEPA does set forth significant substantive 
goals for the nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially 
191 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976). 
1ge 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1976). 
193 See supra text and note at note 96. 
194 See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519(1978); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. 
v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980); contra Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Note, 
The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review Under NEPA, 88 HAR-
VARD L. REV. 735 at 748-50 (In this note, the author suggests that the language of 
Section 101(b) provides judicially manageable standards which allow substantive review 
of NEPA. The author's position is inclusion of the statutory language of "practicability" 
and "consistency with national policy" requires environmental considerations to control 
where environmentally preferable alternatives are available; the author contends that 
in this situation, the least adverse environmental alternative must be selected.) 
195 In Vermont Yankee, Justice Rehnquist stated that while NEPA established sub-
stantive goals for the nation, its mandate to the federal agencies is "essentially pro-
cedural." 435 U.S. at 558. Some lower courts, however, have implied that a substantive 
review of agency performance is appropriate in light of the statute's mandate. See 
Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970); 
Gulf Oil Co. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1973); Detroit Edison Co. v. NRC, 630 F.2d 
450 (6th Cir. 1980); see generally Arnold, supra note 155. 
196 LAKE, supra note 10, at 101. Lake contends that interpretation of NEPA as a 
substantive mandate amounts to an imposition of substantive due process. See also 
Justice Bazelon's remarks in Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (primary function of the courts to "protect these interests from adminis-
trative arbitrariness"). 
197 AsSESSMENTS AND STATEMENTS, supra note 6, at 292. 
198 449 F.2d at 1112. 
199 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
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procedural.":lOO This discrepancy represents a conflicting judicial 
vision of the role of the courts in implementing the statute.:lOI 
Some courts have expressed doubt about whether the judiciary 
can give substantive meaning to the provisions of NEPA. For 
example, in Sierra Club v. Sigler,:llJl the court addressed the issue 
of whether an agency was required to consider a "worst case 
analysis":103 in evaluating a project pursuant to NEPA. In discus-
sing the depth with which the agency was required to consider 
the environmental effects of its actions, the court declared that 
NEPA was "a short statute with broad goals and imprecise meth-
ods of accomplishing them.":104 However, if the statute is viewed as 
a flexible tool designed to establish cultivation of an environmen-
tal quality standard for future generations, this appears an un-
duly pessimistic analysis. 
A close reading of the broad policy statement in Section 101(b) 
of NEPA suggests that the statute provides sufficiently ascer-
tainable parameters:l05 to constitute an enforceable legal mandate. 
The substantive goal of the Act is to promote agency decision 
making that is sensitive to environmental concerns.:l06 Environ-
mental protection per se is not the exclusive goal; the Act is 
designed to require the inclusion of the environmental factors 
among the numerous factors considered by a federal agency in its 
decision-making process.:107 The substance of the Act has been 
judicially recognized as an enforceable duty of federal adminis-
trative agencies.:108 
200 435 u.s. at 558. However, language in the seminal Supreme Court case, Calvert 
Cliffs', could be viewed as the catalyst to substantive review under NEPA. "The duty of 
the judiciary ... is to ensure that environmental purposes, heralded in legislative halls, 
are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of administrative bureaucracy." 499 F.2d 
at 1111. 
201 LAKE, supra note 10, at 97-114. 
202 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983). 
203 [d. at 971-72. 
204 [d. at 965. 
205 See RODGERS, supra note 86, at §§ 7.3,7.4; see also Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 297-98 (8th Cir. 1972); ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY - 8TH 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CEQ (1977). 
206 See Arnold, supra note 155, at 50030-31; Cohen & Warren, Judicial Recognition of 
the Substantive Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,13 B.C. 
INDUS. COMM. L. REV. 685, 693 (1972). 
207 449 F.2d at 1118. 
208 Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 565 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1977); Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. 
Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123, 1138-40 (5th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 
946,953 (7th Cir. 1973); Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 
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There is, however, judicial opposition to the idea of treating 
NEPA as a substantive mandate?l!l In fact, the majority of United 
States Supreme Court Justices have considered NEPA as a pro-
cedural requirement.~l0 The Court's objection to a substantive 
interpretation of NEPA is based in large part on the notion of 
separation of powers. Courts denying the legitimacy of substan-
tive review have resisted an expansion of the judicial role into the 
sphere of administrative authority.~Jl They contend that this in-
appropriate assumption of authority undermines the legislative 
role of policy making.~l~ In addition, proponents of construing 
NEPA as a procedural mandate are concerned about the poten-
tial loss of judicial neutrality through the active direction of the 
NEPA mandate213 - undermining judicial credibility in the eyes 
of the public. According to advocates of judicial self-restraint, 
NEPA created an area of discretion in agency decision making. 
Absent procedural noncompliance, the courts should not impose 
their own judgment as to the appropriate agency decision.~14 
Enforcement of the procedural EIS requirement~15 ensures sub-
stantive compliance with NEPA. Through this procedural re-
quirement NEPA places more exacting strictures upon agency 
decision making than do most statutes:116 Thus, through pro-
cedural obligations, federal agencies comply with a substantive 
policy. 
664-65 (4th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 
298 (8th Cir. 1972); Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1168 (1st Cir. 1980). 
"'" See LAKE, supra note 10, at 104; National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 
(lOth Cir. 1971). 
"10 See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (the only procedural mandates 
imposed by NEPA are those expressly delineated in the language of the statute); 
Vermont Yankee Power Group, Inc. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Strycker's Bay Neigh-
borhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. at 227; see Comment, Vermont Yankee: Supreme 
Court Sets New Limits on Judicial Review of Agency Rule Making, 8 ENVTL. L. REP. 
(ENVTL. L. INST.) 10103 (1978) (a minority view does exist, however, which would entitle 
lower courts' judges to substantive evaluation of an EIS). See Wenner, supra note 150 at 
175. 
"11 Lake,supra note 10, at 110. It has been suggested that administrative agencies now 
constitute a fourth branch in the federal bureaucracy. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. 
Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (l952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
"1" LAKE, supra note 10, at 11I. 
"13 TRIBE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 659 (1971) at 659. 
"14 See 444 U.S. at 227; 427 U.S. at 410 n.21; but see contra, Kelly, Judicial Review of 
Agency Decisions Under the National Governmental Policy Act of 1969: Strycker's Bay 
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 10 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 79, 97 (1982). 
"15 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c); see infra text and notes at note 228. 
"16 See supra note 165 at 407. 
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NEPA encourages substantive environmental sensitivity, if not 
protection, through the procedural requirements of disclosing the 
basis for agency action.217 According to Vermont Yankee: 
The key requirement of NEPA ... is that the agency consider 
and disclose the actual environmental effects ... in a manner 
that will ensure that the overall process, including both the 
generic rulemaking and the individual proceedings, brings 
those effects to bear on decisions to take particular actions 
that significantly affect the environment.218 
This "key requirement of NEPA," the E IS, has been the focal point 
of substantive litigation.:H9 However, judicial perceptions of what 
constitutes sufficient procedural compliance have varied due to the 
conflict about the actual import of the statute itself. 
Confusion about the nature of NEPA's prevailing strength un-
dermines the potential of the Act as a valid national environmen-
tal policy.220 Until the exact nature of the NEPA mandate is 
resolved, agencies cannot meet the statutory directive of com-
pliance "to the fullest extent possible."221 As the trustees of the 
environment, federal agencies are left without a cogent sense of the 
true trust purpose. Consequently, it is impossible for such a trustee 
to implement policy directives of the statute in a manner best suited 
to the needs of the beneficiaries - the American public.222 
IV. THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 
The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) can be considered 
a method of accounting imposed by NEP A upon the agencies 
acting as trustees of the environment to benefit the public.223 As 
trustees, the federal agencies must provide a record of the analy-
sis used in selecting a plan of implementation for a proposed 
project.224 Congress imposed the procedural requirements of the 
EIS to achieve the statutory goal of environmental awareness in 
agency decision making.225 This procedural guarantee is analo-
217 Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d at 1073. 
218 Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 51 
U.S.L.W. at 4680. 
219 WENNER, supra note 150, at 83. 
220 ASSESSMENTS AND STATEMENTS, supra note 6, at 91. 
221 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976). 
222 See supra text and notes at notes 108-11. See also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (1983). 
223 See supra text and notes at notes 105-23. 
224 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976); 40 C.F.R. § 1502 (1983). 
225 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (1983). 
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gous to the fiduciary duty of accounting imposed on the trustee in 
a trust relationship.226 Just as the trustee who is provided with an 
express accounting procedure in the terms of the charitable trust 
instrument itself, federal agencies have a duty to comply with the 
accounting method outlined in Section 102 of NEPA.227 While the 
fiduciary-like relationship between the agencies and the Amer-
ican public should compel a high standard of compliance with the 
EIS requirement, judicial interpretations of federal agency re-
sponsibilities have not been consistent. 
A. Purpose of the EIS 
The EIS provision includes the key procedural requirement 
necessary to fulfill the statutory goals of NEPA. Section 102(2)(c) 
of NEPA requires that all agencies of the federal government: 
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for 
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed 
statement by the responsible official on: 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be 
avoided should the proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's 
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of 
long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action 
should it be implemented.22s 
While this language specifies the components required of the EIS, 
the scope of compliance has been the subject of conflicting in-
terpretations by agencies as well as the courtS.229 
The EIS procedures serve a two-fold purpose: 1) to ensure that 
federal agencies have adequate information about the potential 
environmental consequences of their actions and about legitimate 
alternatives to the proposed action; and 2) to alert the public to 
any possible negative environmental effects of the proposed 
226 See supra text and notes at notes 108-11. 
227 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976). 
226 [d. 
229 See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983); 
see also Note, National Environmental Policy Act: An Ambitious Purpose, A·Partial 
Demise, 15 TULSA L.J. 553, 554 (1980); F. ANDERSON, supra note 86. 
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agency action.:l3O Congress' intent in enacting the EIS require-
ment was to enforce its national environmental policy through 
specified procedures,:l31 thereby holding the federal agencies ac-
countable to a fiduciary standard:l32 for the consequences of 
agency actions implemented upon completion of the EIS proce-
dures.233 The EIS section of NEPA directs federal agencies to 
employ a systematic approach to planning and decision making in 
light of environmental concerns.:l34 
This perspective of the EIS is reflected in the CEQ regulations 
which implement NEPA: 
The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement 
is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the 
policies and goals defined in the Act are infused into the 
ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government. It 
shall provide full and fair discussion of significant environ-
mental impacts and shall inform decision-makers and the 
public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or 
minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the 
human environment ... p5 
It is through the vehicle of Section 102(2Xc) accounting and evalu-
ation procedures that agencies fulfill the mandate of NE P A. Pri-
mary responsibility for satisfying these requirements rests with 
the agency itself.:l36 
The presumption underlying the EIS requirement is that once 
presented with relevant information regarding the effects of a 
proposed action, federal agencies will be reluctant to commit to 
any projects with a demonstrated potential for imposing an un-
duly adverse impact upon the environment.237 While this may 
seem an optimistic assessment of the federal bureaucratic pro-
cess, the mandated public notice and comment procedures upon 
the EIS submitted by the agency is the most effective check on 
230 Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1974). 
231 115 CONGo REC. 40,416; 40,419 (1969). 
232 See supra text and notes at notes 90-115. 
233 Lesser, supra note 135, at 436. 
234 ASSESSMENTS AND STATEMENTS, supra note 6, at 87. 
235 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1983). 
236 449 F.2d at 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See Judge Skelly Wright's description of the NEPA 
procedural mandate in this seminal case of judicial interpretation of NEPA require-
ments as to be strictly adhered to by the agencies.ld. 
237 449 F.2d at 1114; Weinberger v. Catholic Action of HawaiilPeace Action Educ. 
Project, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981); Monroe County Conservation Council V. Volpe, 472 F.2d 
693, 697 (2d Cir. 1972). 
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the agency's action.238 Public participation in the federal agency 
decision-making process is an important procedural safeguard 
against agency actions that impose an undue burden on the 
environment,239 and is consistent with NEPA's goal of availing 
administrative planning to public scrutiny. This public comment 
procedure is analogous to the trust beneficiary's opportunity to 
force the trustee to render an account of his performance in 
administering the trust property.240 
Public participation in the decision-making process acts as a 
check upon agency action in affording review of the merits of the 
decision proposed or actually made. Agency decision making may 
be influenced by the public response to a particular proposaU41 
Hence, coupled with the EIS submission requirement, it has a 
two-fold purpose: 1) to permit the public to protect its own interest 
in the environment through response to government action; and 
2) to act as a watchdog to the actual decisions of an agency which 
could obviate the necessity of challenging agency decisions in 
court. Implicit in this statutory insistence upon public contribu-
tion to agency determination about the harm or effects of any 
particular agency action is the acknowledgement of a governmen-
tal responsibility to the public regarding its treatment of their 
environment. The American public constitutes the class of be-
neficiaries242 under NEPA. Protection of the environment for this 
class of persons is beneficial to the nation and could be viewed as a 
charitable purpose.243 
B. Threshold Determinations Necessary to Require an EIS 
Early in the NEPA process the agency must determine 
whether the proposal presented for implementation is a major 
federal action which will significantly affect the human environ-
ment,244 thereby triggering the requirement of an EIS prepara-
238 California v. Bergland, 483 F. Supp. 465, 496 (E.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in 
part on other grounds, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982); 1-291 Why? Association v. Burns, 372 
F. Supp. 223, 227 (D. Conn. 1974). 
239 Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
240 See supra text and notes at notes 118, 122. 
241 Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d at 951. 
242 See supra text and notes at notes 77, 79. 
243 See supra text and notes at notes 71, 73. 
244 Cf, Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 224-25 (1980); 
Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1975); Aertsen v. Landrieu, 637 F.2d 12, 19 (1st 
Cir.1980). 
1985] NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 771 
tion.245 The threshold determinations as to the necessity of an EIS 
preparation246 were the subject of a great deal of controversy in 
the years following the implementation of NEPA. Since then, 
however, the CEQ regulations, effective July 30, 1979247 have es-
sentially codified the federal court decisions on those threshold 
issues and have provided a clear standard for agencies to deter-
mine whether their proposed actions invoke the procedural parts 
of the EIS. 
1. Significant Impact 
Although the federal regulations promulgated by the CEQ have 
been successful in eliminating confusion as to when an EIS is 
required,248 and are of valid application,249 interpretation of the 
statute has not been exhausted. For example, controversy still 
remains over NEPA's reference to "impact". 
Courts generally give great deference to agency determinations 
regarding the level of harm that would result from their proposed 
actions. This judicial posture affords federal agencies significant 
latitude in deciding whether there are sufficient environmental 
effects to warrant the preparation of an EIS.250 This deference 
accorded to agency decisions as to whether an EIS is required, 
however, is not adopted by all reviewing courts. 
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a much more restrictive test for 
determining the necessity of an EIS preparation due to sig-
nificant impact on the environment of a proposed action.251 Under 
245 Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 
F.2d 1079, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (the other threshold agency activity which requires an 
EIS preparation is any recommendation or report upon agency proposal for legislations). 
246 See Joseph v. Adams, 467 F. Supp. 1451, 1454 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (posed test for 
significant impact as "that whose reasonably expected environmental consequences 
would, in order to comply with the substantive policies of NEPA, effect a decision 
concerning the need for, or the proposed location or design of, the federal proposal"); see 
supra note 165. 
247 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 col. 2 (1978); ENVIRONMENTAL QUAUTY 1981: 12TH ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUAUTY 171 (1982); Yost, Streamlining 
NEPA: An Environmental Success Story, 9 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV. 507, 509 (1981-82). 
248 See Yost, supra note 247, at 507. (At the time the article was written and published, 
the author was the General Counsel to the Council on Environmental Quality in the 
Executive Office of the President. Since that time, he has compiled an excellent prac-
titioner's guide to THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT PROCESS C.P.S. (BNA) 27 
(1982) [hereinafter EIS PROCESS]. 
249 Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979). 
250 New York v. U.S. Department of Transportation, 715 F.2d 732, 750 (2d Cir. 1983). 
251 See City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Foundation for 
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this strict approach, the EIS requirement is triggered whenever a 
federal action "may cause significant degradation of some envi-
ronmental factor."~5~ The implications of this test as so worded 
limit the sphere of its influence to a narrow category of environ-
mental effects. Only those environmental consequences of a pro-
posed agency action which have already been determined to ulti-
mately degrade the environment will be considered sufficient to 
require an EIS. Any environmental effect of a proposed action 
which does not meet the "degradation" standard falls short of the 
threshold requirement for the development of an EIS.~53 This high 
threshold standard seems to be contrary to the prophylactic pur-
pose of NEPA. It confines the necessity of the EIS to instances of 
potentially extreme environmental degradation, a difficult 
threshold to meet. This is inconsistent with the fiduciary standard 
of duty owed by the trustee to the trust beneficiaries in the 
treatment of the trust property. 
If an agency concludes, after preparing an Environmental As-
sessment/54 that its proposed action will not promote or cause any 
significant impacts upon the environment, it must submit an 
evaluative report to the CEQ supporting that conclusion.~5 An 
agency's "negative determination" and submission of a "Finding 
of No Significant Impact" (FONS!) report does not, however, 
relieve the agency of all further participation in the EIS proce-
dures. Under the CEQ regulations, the agency must afford the 
public thirty days to review this finding before it may initiate any 
action upon the proposal.~6 The FONSI report must be clearly 
supported by the evidence in order to satisfy public evaluation. 
This review is necessary to ensure that agencies do not use the 
FONSI report to avoid the process of accountability implicit in the 
NEPA mandate.~7 
The circuit courts are divided as to the standard of review to be 
employed to evaluate the validity of an agency's negative deter-
North American Wild Sheep v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 681 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
"2 Davis, 521 F.2d at 673; Sheep, 681 F.2d at 1178. 
253 Davis, 521 F.2d at 673; Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814, 
817 n.5 (9th Cir. 1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 1973). 
"4 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3, 1501.4 (1983). 
25.' 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(c), 1508.13 (1983). 
256 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (1983). 
257 See CEQ Memorandum Answering Common NEPA Qustions questions 37e-38 re-
printed in EIS PROCESS, supra note 248, at B-812. 
----~----------
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mination.:!.'i8 The courts have adopted three different views of the 
judicial responsibility to review such agency findings.~59 Upon 
review of a "negative determination" regarding an EIS, the 
Seventh, Fourth, and the Second Circuits accord great deference 
to the agency's expertise and employ the low threshold "arbitrary 
and capricious" standard~60 to review the agency finding.~61 In 
contrast, the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have applied a 
more stringent "reasonableness" test, which requires an evalua-
tion of supporting evidence in the record to determine whether 
there is a rational basis for the agency's finding.~6~ This standard 
of review for agency "negative determinations" accords less de-
ference to the agency and reflects judicial skepticism of agency 
good faith efforts to comply with NEPA.~63 The D.C. Circuit uses a 
third standard of review which employs Judge Skelly Wright's 
analysis264 of the agency determination not to file an EIS.~6.'i Ab-
sent a more consistent standard of review, the judiciary provides 
little guidance for agencies in determining what is sufficient for 
NEPA compliance. This lack of consensus illustrates the 
judiciary's inability to agree on the statutory requirements im-
posed by agency decisions. 
2. Major Federal Action 
"Major federal action"~66 is yet another threshold for the re-
quirement of EIS preparation.~67 The CEQ regulations expressly 
"58 Delaware Water Emergency Group v. Hansler, 536 F. Supp. 26, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
".'9 NEPA itself does not confer a grant of standing. See supra note 86. 
"60 See The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1982). 
"61 First National Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973); Rucker 
v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972). 
"6" 5 U.S.C. § 55 (1982). 
"63 Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); 
Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973); Save Our 
Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973). 
"64 Judge Skelly Wright of the D.C. Circuit presented his view of the EIS threshold 
requirement in Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (S.C.R.A.P.) v. 
United States, 346 F. Supp. 189, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In this case Judge Wright was 
concerned about the ICC's attempts to circumvent the compliance with the NEPA 
mandate through an internal finding of "no significant impact." Favoring preservation 
of the environment over the railroad companies' assertion of increased railroad 
efficiency of operation as he balanced public interest, Judge Wright used strong lan-
guage in SCRAP II. He was offended by "so transparent a ruse" on the part of the ICC 
which may have contributed to his evocation of a low threshold to be satisfied to qualify 
for the NEPA procedural requirements. [d. 
"65 SCRAP II, 346 F. Supp. at 20l. 
"66 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1983). 
"67 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976). 
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address the types of action which come within the ambit of the 
statute. Essentially, "major" of major federal action and "sig-
nificantly" of significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment blur as distinct concepts and requirements; the reg-
ulations define "major" as reinforcement of, but not independent 
of "significantly."~68 
Both courts and agencies have struggled to define the param-
eters of a "federal" action. This problem has arisen frequently in 
determing whether federal agency supervision~69 or planning of a 
project~70 should be considered tantamount to a "federal" action. 
Similarly, this issue has arisen in cases where agency action or 
involvement is contemplated but has yet to occur.~71 Case law 
discussion of what actually constitutes agency action sufficient to 
require compliance with the EIS requirements suggests that 
even the most tenuous federal participation will make a project 
"federal."~n In most instances, any agency action or proposal is 
presumed to be a "federal" action/73 thereby subjecting most 
agency actions to the policies and procedures outlined in NEP A. 
This could be interpreted as judicial recognition of the NEPA 
directive governing all federal activity affecting the environment. 
Such an interpretation provides federal agencies with a responsi-
bility commensurate with the standard of duty owed by agencies 
in their capacity as trustees of the environment.~74 
Despite the CEQ regulations of the "major federal action" pro-
vision, the distinction between active federal participation in a 
project and the mere implementation of a project or federal is-
suance of a permit to those engaged in private activity remains a 
contested issue.~75 For example, in Roosevelt Campobello Interna-
tional Park Commission v. United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ,276 the First Circuit held that the EPA's issuance of a 
268 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1983). "Major federal" has been defined as that which "requires 
substantial planning, time, resources or expenditure." National Resources Defense 
Council v. Grant, '341 F. Supp. 356, 366-67 (E.D.N.C. 1972). 
269 Davis v. Morton, 335 F. Supp. 1258 (D.N. Mex. 1971), rev'd 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 
1973). 
270 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) (1983). 
271 I. SCHOENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW, at 118 (1982). 
272 McGnEGOR, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 110 (1981). 
273 Id. 
274 See supra t-ext and notes at notes 90-115. 
275 See Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973); Boston Waterfront Residents 
Association v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1972); Greene County Planning Board v. 
Federal Power Commission, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) (1983). 
276 684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982). 
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pollution discharge permit277 allowing private parties to construct 
an oil refinery and deep water port invoked the procedural re-
quirements of the EIS.278 The court found that the EPA license 
was based on insufficient analysis and ordered the EPA to file a 
supplemental EIS before approving the project.279 
The court did not specifically address the issue of whether the 
EPA permit process constituted federal action but merely as-
sumed that the issuance of the permit subjected the EPA to the 
EIS requirements.280 However, the court did agree with the EPA's 
argument that privately sponsored projects should be judged by a 
different standard than publicly funded projects.281 In evaluating 
the alternatives to the proposal in question, the EPA applied the 
more lenient test of "whether the proposed site is environmen-
tally acceptable," rather than the analysis used in evaluating 
publicly funded projects of whether the proposed site is the "op-
timum site."282 The court implicitly adopted the agency's argu-
ment that the "less searching analysis"283 of "substantially pref-
erable"284 alternatives is appropriate when agency funding or 
implementation is not instrumental to the project's success. 
Underlying this distinction between publicly and privately 
funded projects is the belief that federal license and permit proce-
dures render private actions "federal" in nature for the purposes 
of NEPA compliance.2&; This assumption extends the applicability 
of the EIS requirements beyond the confines of federal agencies 
and public projects. 
Reliance upon government funding as a trigger mechanism for 
compliance with the EIS provisions seems to contradict Andrus v. 
Sierra Club/86 where the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
an EIS is not required to accompany agency appropriations re-
'" 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376, 1342 (Supp. v 1981). 
"78 684 F.2d at 1055. 
"7') [d. at 1057. 
"80 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1983). 
"" 684 F.2d at 1047. 
"8" [d. at 1046. 
"83 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1982, supra note 17 at 237. 
"84 684 F.2d at 1047; cf. New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. Nuclear Regu-
latory Comm'n, 582 F.2d 87, at 95-96 (1st Cir. 1978). 
"H5 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) (1983) ("including projects and programs entirely or partly 
financed, assisted, conducted, regulated or approved by Federal agencies"). 
"86 442 U.S. 347 (1979). See Note, NEPA After Andrus v. Sierra Club: The Doctrine of 
Substantial Deference to the Regulations Council on Environmental Quality, 66 VA. L. 
REV. 843 (1980). 
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quests.:l87 In that case, the Court relied upon the CEQ definition of 
"major" as dependent but supplemental to "significant" in reach-
ing this conclusion. The First Circuit, in an opinion delivered prior 
to Roosevelt Campobello, also used a narrow definition to avoid 
imposing the EIS requirement at the funding stage. The Court in 
Aertsen v. Landrieu288 held that funds designated for expenditure 
by an agency did not come within the scope of "resources" as 
statutorily prescribed.289 
The essence of NEPA is contradicted by this holding,290 since 
decisions made at the funding stage of an agency project affect 
the ultimate course of action selected and implementation of that 
project. Some commentators have interpreted this finding as in-
dicative of a conservative trend in the judiciary toward environ-
mental issues291 which de-emphasizes the values of conservation 
in the regulation of agency decision making.292 This decision 
jeopardizes the effectiveness of NEPA's policy goals, since it 
eliminates the opportunity to influence decision making early in 
the process, such as at the appropriations stage.293 
C. EIS Preparation 
1. Compliance 
Once the threshold requirements of Section 102(2)(c)294 have 
been satisfied, the appropriate federal agency must comply with 
the procedural requirements outlined in NEPA. These procedures 
were conceived as the best way of achieving the environmental 
policy.295 Primary judicial focus upon the procedural aspect of 
NEPA:l96 is justified due to the reflection of agency attempts to 
comply with the statute embodied in the EIS - providing a 
mechanism for challenge to a proposed agency action.297 Section 
"87 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1978). 
'88 637 F.2d at 20. 
"89 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976). See Note, supra note 286, at 849. 
"90 See supra note 229, at 554. 
"91 [d. at 519; Frank & Eckhard, supra note 130,682-83. 
"9" Eckhard, supra note 130, at 682. 
""3 See Note. supra note 229, at 559-60. 
"94 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976). 
"95 S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CONGo & AD. NEWS 
40416. 
'96 See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
""7 Anderson, supra note 86, at 278. 
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102 of NEPA~98 has been interpreted as providing299 a legal stan-
dard sufficient to prescribe agency action and violations thereof. 
Further evidence of the importance of these procedural elements 
is the statute's requirement of compliance "to the fullest extent 
possible."300 This provision suggests that the goals of requiring 
agency consideration of environmental consequences are only 
possible if the agencies faithfully adhere to the prescribed proce-
dures.301 
Submission of a proper EIS by the agency is necessary to 
comply with the procedural mandates outlined in NEPA's Section 
102(2)(c).30~ While courts have recognized that agencies cannot be 
held to the duty of submitting perfect EIS's,303 a proper EIS must 
present and evaluate all of the factors prescribed in Section 
102(2)(c) in an analytical fashion.304 The EIS must contain discus-
sion and analysis sufficient to allow for proper evaluation.305 In 
order to satisfy the "detailed statement" requirement of 
102(2)(c),306 agencies must provide "sufficient detail to ensure that 
the agency has acted in good faith, made a full disclosure, and 
insured the integrity of the process."307 The statement must be 
comprehensive yet understandable and nonconclusory308 in its 
assessment of the consequences of the proposed action. Every 
significant aspect of the environmental impact of the proposed 
agency action must be weighed.309 In addition to providing a fac-
tual pre~entation, the EIS must also account for and include 
legitimate forecasts and discussion of potential alternatives, even 
those rejected by the agency in its internal analysis.3lO 
'98 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976). 
'99 See Kelly, supra note 214, at 89 (1982); see Leventhal, supra note 35, at 513. 
300 Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic River Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 787 (1976); Public Service 
Co. of New Hampshire v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 582 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1978). 
301 Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974). 
30' 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976). 
303 Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of (Engineers, 470 F.2d at 297. 
304 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(a) (1983). For a discussion of whether analysis or simply descrip-
tion has become the foundation for the EIS, see CEQ Memoranda Summarizing Public 
Response to 1978 Regulations, at 5 (July 12, 1983). See also 48 Fed. Reg. 146, 34263-68 
(1983). 
305 County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375 (2d Cir. 1975). 
306 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976). 
307 Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979). 
308 MCGREGOR, supra note 272, at 11I. 
309 Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 519 (cited in New York v. Dept. of Transportation, 715 
F.2d at 754 (Oakes, J., dissenting». 
310 Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068 (1st Cir. 1980). 
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2. Alternatives 
The requirement of agency evaluation of alternatives311 to the 
proposal is considered the "heart of the environmental impact 
statement."312 This element of the EIS has been termed the "lin-
chpin"313 of the NEPA procedural mandate and requires a 
thorough study and detailed discussion of alternatives to the 
proposed agency action.314 While there is a consensus as to the 
importance of this portion of the EIS,315 the "concept of 'alterna-
tives' is an evolving one."316 A thorough, good faith compliance 
with the alternatives assessment requirement is crucial to an 
informed agency decision regarding the best manner in which to 
achieve the agency goal.317 
Analysis of alternatives to the proposed agency action is con-
trolled by the "rule of reason."31S Judge Leventhal, in stating the 
case regarding the consideration of Section 102(2)(c)(iii) alterna-
tives, posed the currenP19 standard as "reasonableness."320 An 
EIS should be of sufficient depth to provide the agency with a 
sound basis for a reasoned decision,321 and must include: 1) discus-
sion of a "no-action" alternative;322 2) an evaluation of different 
methods of achieving the objective sought by the agency outside 
the jurisdiction of the agency preparing the EIS;323 and 3) meth-
ods of partial satisfaction of the agency goal with less detrimental 
31l NEPA has two alternatives requirements: §§ 102(2)(CXiii) and 102(2XE). An in-
terpretation of the distinction between the two sections is posed in Environmental 
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974). Section 102(2)(E) 
is triggered even when § 102(2)(CXiii) is not. 
Clearly § 102(2)(E) is supplemental to and more extensive in its command than 
the requirements of 102(2)(C)(iii). It was intended to emphasize an important 
part of NEPA's theme that all change was not progress and to insist that no 
major federal project should be undertaken without intense consideration of 
other more ecologically sound courses of action .... New York v. Dept. of 
Transportation, 715 F.2d at 742. 
312 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1983). 
313 Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir. 1972). 
314 See Grazing Fields Farm, 626 F.2d 1068. 
315 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1983). 
316 Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 551-
317 Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d at 953. 
318 See NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Grazing Fields, 626 F.2d 1068; 
Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 551-55. 
319 See Lesser, supra note 134, at 375; Natural Resources Defense Council v. Calloway, 
524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975). 
320 See Leventhal, supra note 35, at 520-21-
321 NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d at 836. 
322 458 F.2d at 834. 
323 [d. at 834-35. 
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environmental consequences.3Z4 The policy underlying this re-
quirement is that a decision-maker confronted with a range of 
reasonable choices should be afforded the opportunity to achieve 
the agency objective and at the same time comply with the man-
date of NEPA.3z5 
The degree to which any particular alternative should be dis-
cussed in an EIS or considered at all by the agency is dependent 
upon the surrounding circumstances.3z6 The agencies themselves 
are initially responsible for determining the range of alternatives 
considered appropriate to the project,3Z7 and to be included in the 
EIS. The agency's duty to discuss alternatives is not clearly de-
fined in the statute; therefore, the agencies themselves must 
weigh the reasonableness of the various options to the proposed 
action. 
In Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Watt,3Z8 the First Circuit 
stated that the reasonableness of proposed alternatives should be 
determined "by how much the likely environmental harm will be 
reduced"3z9 by another selection. In contrast, the Second Circuit 
imposes a higher standard on agencies to consider alternatives to 
the proposed action. In City of New York v. United States Depart-
ment of Transportation,330 the Second Circuit employed a risk 
assessment analysis in concluding that the transportation of toxic 
substances is an action with potential environmental conse-
quences.331 The court held that the DOT was not required to 
assess the movement of toxic substances by a barge as an alter-
native because the agency was charged with responsibility of 
creating national regulations for highway transportation.33z The 
court found the analysis of alternatives dependent upon the mis-
sion of the agency.333 According to the court, the agency's statu-
tory mandate determines the scope of alternatives the agency 
3,. Id. at 856. 
325 Lesser, supra note 134, at 379. 
326 Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430, 436 (5th Cir. 1981). 
327 North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 601 (D.D.C. 1980). 
3'8 716 F.2d 946. 
329 Id. at 949. 
330 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983). 
331 Id. at 744. 
332 Id. 
333 Id. at 743. This is reminiscent of Leventhal's discussion of imposing duties regard-
ing the environment upon agencies with no avowed environmentally-based mission. See 
Leventhal, supra note 35, at 515. 
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was required to review.334 Both of these standards require a 
balancing of the public interest against consideration of the 
agency purpose335 and the project feasibility.336 
In the recent case of Friends of the River v. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission,337 however, the D.C. Circuit adopted a 
standard according far more deference to the administrative 
agency in determining the alternatives which an agency is re-
quired to consider.338 The court accepted the agency presentation 
of alternatives as within the bounds of administrative particular-
ity.339 While the court found that the agency should have consid-
ered the alternative of purchasing power to its proposal rooted in 
power generation,340 the court did not review the agency methods 
of surveying alternatives. It simply accepted the alternative as 
appropriate to a NEPA analysis because they had found so in a 
case three years prior to the instant case.341 The court directed its 
attention to the issue of recording agency considerations of alter-
natives in the EIS itself.342 Finding that FERC's failure to present 
the power purchasing alternative in the EIS clearly contravened 
the mandates of NEPA,343 the court still decided that a remand 
was unnecessary:344 "the EIS ... is not an end in itself but 
rather a means toward the goal of better decision-making."345 The 
deferential stance of the court in Friends of the River allowed the 
majority to find agency consideration of alternatives adequate 
although not presented in the EIS.346 In the opinion of the court, 
therefore, a remand would not "meaningfully serve NEPA's 
goals."347 
Although the focal point of much prior litigation,348 the ade-
quacy of the EIS remains subject to case by case analysis. As 
illustrated by the disparate judicial treatment of the alternative 
334 "The scope of alternatives to be considered is a function of how narrowly or broadly 
one views the objective of an agency's proposed action." 715 F.2d at 743. 
3.% See discussion supra text and notes at notes 148-151. 
336 Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 551. 
337 720 F.2d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
338 Id. at 110. 
3.'19 Id. at 105. 
340 Id. 
341 Swinomish Tribal Community v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 627 F.2d 499, 
514-15 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
342 720 F.2d at 105-09; See Grazing Fields Farm, 626 F.2d at 1068. 
343 720 F.2d at 106. 
344 Id. 
345 Id., quoting North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d at 599-600 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
346 720 F.2d at 106. 
347 Id. 
348 "Trends in NEPA Litigation," ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1982 supra note 17 at 235. 
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assessment requirement, a consistent "common law of NEPA" 
has yet to develop in this particular area. Any effort to provide a 
consistent standard in evaluating the requirements of NEPA 
must originate with the judiciary in their assessment of the 
duties of federal agencies to comply with the policies underlying 
the statute. Efforts to develop a standard of federal government 
"accountability"349 for the environment by infusing environmen-
tal concerns into the agency decision-making process can only be 
fully achieved through requiring an agency to evaluate alterna-
tives to its proposed action. Thus, the decision-maker is presented 
with a "clear basis for choice among options."350 Federal agencies 
must be required to provide a thorough discussion of the "reason-
able alternatives"351 within the EIS itself if such a document is to 
have any influence on the agency's selection of a final course of 
action.35:! Proper consideration of alternatives provides a manner 
of accomplishing Congress' goal of promoting environmentally 
sensible agency decision making. 
While courts have taken inconsistent views of the required 
contents of an EIS, this inconsistency has been compounded by 
confusion over the basis for judicial review of agency compliance 
with the EIS requirements. NEPA prescribes the procedural 
elements of the EIS process. Yet, upon judicial review, the EIS 
does not always reflect proper agency compliance with the stat-
ute.353 If the requirements of Section 102 are observed in good 
faith by an agency, the substantive goals of NEPA will become 
effective. Without a clear judicial standard for compliance with 
the EIS, however, the danger exists that agencies will circumvent 
these requirements and undermine the goal of NEPA. The 
agency as trustee will fail in its duty to account for the trust 
property management to the beneficiaries.354 
V. EIS VS. THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD: WHICH CONSTITUTES 
THE BASIS OF JUDICIAL REVIEw? 
Presentation of the alternatives considered by the trustee in 
selecting the method best suited to fulfill the goals of the settlor 
349 s. REP. No. 94-52, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS, 859, 865. 
350 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1983). 
351 Id. 
352 See generally, Leventhal, supra note 35; Natural Resources Defense Council V. 
Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Kelly, supra note 214; Grazing Fields Farm V. 
Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068. 
353 See supra text and notes at notes 25(}'265. 
354 See supra text and notes at notes 107-115. 
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and the needs of the beneficiaries is inherent in the accounting 
process.355 Similarly, under Section 102(2)(c) of NEPA, agencies 
must consider reasonable alternatives to proposed federal ac-
tion.356 In evaluating the sufficiency of an agency's consideration 
of alternatives in an EIS, a reviewing court must employ the 
"rule of reason" standard3.~7 in reviewing the adequacy of the EIS. 
The First Circuit, in Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, viewed 
the administrative record as the standard by which to judge the 
adequacy of the discussion of alternatives in the EIS itself.358 
In an effort to avoid post hoc rationalizations by agencies,359 
NEPA established the requirement of an EIS which should en-
capsulate the factors in the agency decision-making process. 
Agency considerations of alternatives to the proposed plan pur-
suant to Section 102(2)(c)(iii) must be summarized in the EIS.360 
Evidence of a particular alternative's infeasibility may be ascer-
tained through review of the administrative record when not 
included in the EIS for that reason,361 but the administrative 
record cannot supplant the EIS in the estimation of the First 
Circuit. 
A question now exists about whether the precedent established 
by the First Circuit in Grazing Fields Farm mandates that a full 
discussion of reasonable alternatives to a proposal for major fed-
eral agency action be contained or incorporated by reference 
within the EIS itself in order to achieve'successful compliance 
with Section 102(2)(c) of NEP A. The status of Grazing Fields 
Farm v. Goldschmidt as precedent for the mandate of a self-
contained, sufficient discussion of alternatives within the Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement has been eroded by subsequent 
judicial interpretations of the EIS requirement. 
An important element of Grazing Fields Farm was the First 
Circuit's attempt to refine the somewhat amorphous parameters 
of judicial responsibility under NE P A regarding the judicial eval-
355 See supra text and notes at notes 104, 110. 
a'6 720 F.2d at 106; 626 F.2d at 1074; Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 
F.2d at 834. 
357 This standard of review is adopted by the First Circuit in Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d at 884; see also 626 F:2d at 1074; 720 F.2d at 120 
(Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). 
358 626 F.2d at 1073; see also 1-291 Why? Association v. Burns, 517 F.2d at 108!. 
359 720 F.2d at 106. 
360 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(iii) (1976); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14; see also Grazing Fields Farm, 626 
F.2d 1068. 
361 626 F.2d at 1074. 
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uation of the sufficiency ofEIS compliance by a federal agency.362 
The First Circuit attempted to set forth the standards of judi-
cial review of agency discretion, and, despite the widely accepted 
validity of this attempt, the result is often contrary to the envi-
ronmental goals imposed by NEPA.363 Consequently, the primary 
focus of the Grazing Fields Farm decision addressed the relation-
ship of the administrative record prepared by the agency for its 
own decision-making purposes to the EIS prepared pursuant to 
the NEPA dictate.364 
The Fifth Circuit in Piedmont Heights Civil Club, Inc. v. More-
land,365 distinguished Grazing Fields Farm by limiting an inap-
propriate administrative record to that which has not been incor-
porated into the EIS. The court found that reports not included 
in, nor circulated with the EIS were sufficient to satisfy NEPA if 
simply referred to in the EIS and made available to public com-
ment.366 In addition, Wade v. Lewis ,367 decided in the Seventh 
Circuit, held that a supplemental administrative record ade-
quately satisfied the EIS requirements in spite of the piecemeal 
presentation of a basis upon which to evaluate the environmental 
consequences of highway construction.368 Like Grazing Fields 
Farm, both these cases concern the development of highways; 
and if read jointly, they could tarnish the relatively unscarred 
precedential value of Grazing Fields Farm on the subject of the 
adequacy of EIS discussion of alternatives and therefore the 
adequacy of the EIS itself. 
It is possible that the recent decision of the D.C. Circuit in 
Friends of the River v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission369 
may severely undermine the precedential value of Grazing Fields 
Farm370 by allowing an EIS violation to remain without remedy 
through application of a low threshold-balancing analysis.371 The 
362 626 F.2d 1072; see also 435 U.S. 558 (1978). 
363 Leventhal, supra note 35, at 515. 
364 626 F.2d at 1073-74. 
as:; 637 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1981). 
366 [d. at 438. 
367 561 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
368 [d. at 948 (The court here uses the arbitrary and capricious standard of review on 
the issue of alternatives as addressed in the EIS). . 
369 720 F .2d 93. 
370 626 F.2d at 1068. 
371 720 F.2d at 106 (Judge Ginzburg, writing for the majority, while emphasizing the 
import of the NEPA procedural mandate essentially indicates that the observance of the 
specified EIS procedures would not assist here in the accomplishment of NEPA's goals). 
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D.C. Circuit in Friend-s of the River developed a position contrary 
to that of the First Circuit in Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt 
regarding the substantiation required for agency study of alter-
natives as required by Section 102(2)(c) of NEPA. As a result, the 
self-contained discussion of reasonable alternatives to an agency 
proposal previously limited to presentation in the EIS,37~ may now 
be interpreted to expand to the entire administrative record. 
Friends of the River is the most recent case to address the issue 
of the administrative record as a legitimate supplement to an EIS 
discussion of alternatives to the major federal agency action.373 
While not a case involving highway construction, and therefore 
distinguishable from Grazing Fields Farm,374 Friends of the River 
has the potential to undermine the more liberal holding of the 
First Circuit. Considered the pre-eminent judicial forum for ad-
ministrative law,375 the D.C. Circuit, in Friends of the River, dis-
played the utmost deference to FERC in affirming the agency's 
licensing of a hydroelectric plant despite noncompliance with the 
procedural mandate of NEPA.376 Employing a balancing analysis, 
the court held that a remand would serve "no sensible purpose" 
notwithstanding the agency's failure to discuss the purchase of 
power as a viable alternative.377 Citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club,378 the 
court allowed the determination regarding the filing of an EIS as 
"properly left to the informed discretion"379 of the agency.380 
The majority opinion in Friends of the River, delivered by Judge 
Ginzburg, accepted the plaintiff's view that FERC had not con-
sidered a legitimate alternative within the EIS itself.381 However, 
the reasoning offered for the court's view of power purchasing as 
m See 626 F.2d at 1072-74 ("(Even) ... Congress has specified the procedural means 
appropriate to vindicate the substantive goals of NEPA. Section 4332(2)(c) ... orders the 
agency to prepare a detailed statement discussing the environmental issues." [d. at 
1072). 
373 720 F.2d at 93. 
374 Segmentation analysis is the title given analysis of the impact of highway construc-
tion on the environment at various points along the proposed route. 
375 See Wenner, supra note 149, at 103. 
376 720 F.2d at 106. 
377 See 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(b) (1983); Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1115 (Judge Wright 
interpreted the NEPA mandate to require a finely tuned and systematic balancing 
analysis as necessary to achievement of the statutory goal, see also Richland Park 
Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1982).) 
378 427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
379 720 F.2d at 104 n.21. 
380 [d. at 412. 
38' 720 F.2d at 106. 
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an alternative deserving of discussion in the EIS rests solely upon 
the assertion that once before the court had accepted purchased 
power as an alternative within NEPA and therefore would do so 
again.382 This analysis does not suggest an effort of serious evalu-
ation of the alternative in light of the project goals and the agency 
mission.383 
The court, in a discussion of agency decision-making, compared 
the "substantial evidence"384 required of an agency decision to be 
demonstrated throughout the record with the NEPA mandate of 
a single integrated document, the EIS.385 While not explicitly 
distinguishing Grazing Fields Farm, the court virtually ignored 
the substantive import of the First Circuit opinion in determining 
that although FERC clearly did not comply with the required 
Section 102(2Xc) alternatives discussion, there was no justification 
for a remand. Remand was considered unnecessary due to the 
court's confidence, upon review of the administrative record, that 
FERC had given due consideration to the relevant environmental 
factors386 and had performed this obligation in an "accessible, 
intelligible form."387 
The court insisted that a remand due to the deficiency in the 
EIS would jeopardize NEPA's "lofty declarations"388 in requiring 
38" 720 F.2d at 105. 
383 See City of New York v. United States Department of Transportation, 715 F.2d 732 
(2d Cir. 1983). McChesney, Vermont Yankee Revisited: High Court Upholds NRC's S-3 
Table for Second Time, 13 ENVTL L. REP. (ENVTL L. INST.) 10239 (8183). One of these three 
cases overturned by the Supreme Court was the Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., in which Justice O'Connor reversed Judge Bazelon for 
the second time in the ten year saga of the Vermont Yankee litigation. It is conceivable 
that the D.C. Circuit wishes to maintain its position as the arbiter of administrative law 
decisions and consequently, the validity of their decisions; an end possibly achieved 
through a more conservative approach to environmental issues and deference to federal 
agencies. It is possible that the Circuit Court, acknowledged as more sophisticated in 
administrative law analysis than most courts, has departed from its usually more 
rigorous analysis in the wake of the Vermont Yankee experience. In the ten years of 
litigation and administrative procedures involved in the Vermont Yankee case, the 
Supreme Court has twice reversed Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit as 
to the applicable interpretation of NEPA; more precisely, what is required of an EIS. As 
the first decision to address a NEPA issue since the June, 1983 Supreme Court decision 
in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the D.C. 
Circuit may be more concerned with trying to protect its credibility as the arbiter of 
administrative law issues rather than paying due respect to the substance of NEPA. 
384 720 F.2d at 105-06. 
3&' [d. at 106. 
3!!6 [d. at 108. 
387 I d., notes 32-33. 
388 [d. at 108. 
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further action from the agency which had essentially complied 
with NEPA. Such compliance was found by the court upon review 
of the administrative record, not the EIS itself. In doing so the 
majority ignored the reasoning of Grazing Fields Farm, in which 
the importance of the circulation and public comment of the EIS 
is stressed389 in recognition of the accountability element of that 
procedure. Unlike the EIS, an administrative record is not circu-
lated to the public, thereby avoiding exposure of agency 
decision making.390 
The majority opinion discussed the absence in the administra-
tive record of any post hoc rationalizations on the part of FERC. 
FERC made a good faith attempt to fulfill the NEPA policy, if not 
the procedural goals.391 In essence, the majority appears to be 
applying the "substantial evidence" evaluation of the record em-
ployed in administrative law under the Administrative Procedure 
Act,392 while allegedly involved in an analysis of NEPA and its 
procedural mechanism, the EIS.393 While citing Grazing Fields 
Farm,394 the court does not address the First Circuit's reasoning 
regarding the necessity of a self-contained discussion of alterna-
tives within the EIS itself.395 Claiming to hold the Commission to a 
"strict standard of compliance,"396 the court essentially displayed 
great deference to the agency procedure.397 
In contrast to the majority opinion, Judge Bazelon, in a 
strongly worded dissent, strictly construed the NEPA require-
ment of a "rigorous consideration of alternatives in a form which 
will facilitate public comment"398 to require FERC compliance 
with the statute.399 Alluding to "blatant statutory violations"400 on 
the part of FERC, Judge Bazelon took the position that unless 
strictly applied, the procedural mechanisms of NEPA will be flag-
389 See 626 F.2d at 1073; Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677, 693 (9th Cir. 1974). 
390 626 F.2d at 1074. 
391 720 F.2d at 106-07. 
:l!" 5 U.S.C. § 557; see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
393 720 F.2d at 106. 
3!H Id . 
. 19' Id . 
. 196 Id. at 110. 
397 Id. (The majority opinion is conciusory in its assessment of FERC compliance with 
the "concerns underlying NEPA" as justification for failure to comply with the statute's 
procedural mandate). 
398 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (1983); 720 F.2d at 120. 
399 720 F.2d at 124 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). 
"" Id. at 123. 
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rantly ignored and in essence, emasculated.401 The dissent noted 
the importance of public circulation and comment,402 an analysis 
more consistent with that utilized by the First Circuit in Grazing 
Fields Farm. Judge Bazelon pays greater attention to the spe-
cific purposes of NEPA compliance as ultimately achieving the 
statutory policy goal than does the majority. 
The result of the Bazelon approach is a far more coherent and 
statutorily based analysis than that engaged in by the majority. 
His view that the administrative record cannot cure the deficien-
cies of the EIS rested soundly upon the language of Grazing 
Fields Farm. According to Bazelon, to rob the EIS requirement of 
an appropriate discussion of alternatives within the statement 
itself would "undermine the very foundation of NEPA."403 
VI. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS To NEP A 
NEPA is considered by some scholars as the "most decisive 
single piece of legislation in the field of environmental protec-
tion."404 Inconsistent construction of the Act among scholars, 
commentators, judges, and administrators, however, detracts 
from its effectiveness in achieving its goals of protecting the 
environment. To preserve and protect the nation's natural re-
sources by infusing environmental considerations into the agency 
decision-making process requires an amendment to the statute. 
Judicial interpretation of NEPA has shaped the enforcement and 
implementation of the statute over the past fourteen years.405 
Unless some effort is made to codify these standards into a uni-
form set of guidelines, however, the statute will never fully attain 
its purpose. Just as the Council of Environmental Quality drew 
from judicial construction of NEPA in preparing the implement-
ing regulations for the statute, Congress should amend NEPA to 
incorporate the principles that have evolved through judicial in-
terpretation. 
NEPA should be amended to include more specific language 
401 Id. 
402 Id. at 120 nn.102, 121. 
403 Id. at 123. 
404 ASSESSMENTS AND STATEMENTS, supra note 6, at 291. But see contra LAKE, supra 
note 10, at 93-94 (Lake views the Administrative Procedure Act as the foundation for the 
development of environmental law and as a more effective tool for litigation purposes 
than is NEPA). 
405 See supra text and notes at notes 160-222. 
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regarding agency responsibilities under the Act. In its current 
form, the statute raises several ambiguities as to what procedural 
guidelines federal agencies must observe to comply with the 
mandate of the statute. The most important of these ambiguities 
involves the issue of the role of the EIS. The Act should explicitly 
describe the importance of the EIS as a comprehensive, inte-
grated summary of the agency decision-making process. The EIS 
alone should be used to evaluate the degree of agency compliance 
with the procedural requirements of the statute. 
Analysis of the EIS, however, cannot be effectively formulated 
unless the judiciary applies a consistent standard of review in 
evaluating agency compliance with the procedural mandates of 
NEPA. The statute should therefore be amended to provide a 
definitive standard of judicial review for evaluating agency com-
pliance with the Act. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977406 
provide a clear illustration of how the statutory amendment pro-
cess may be used to formulate a consistent standard of judicial 
review. Congress amended the Clean Air Act to codify the stan-
dard of review that had evolved through the course of early 
litigation under the Act.407 Similarly, Congress should amend 
NEPA to include a reasonableness standard of judicial review for 
evaluating the adequacy of agency action under the statute. A 
synthesis of the past fourteen years of litigation is possible via 
statutory recognition of the high level of duty imposed upon 
federal agencies in a trustee capacity through judicial application 
of the "reasonableness" standard to agency decision making. 
Adoption of a reasonableness standard would clarify the respon-
sibilities of federal agencies under the Act, and would eliminate 
much of the confusion created by the varying judicial views of the 
requirements imposed by NEPA. 
Finally, the amendments to NEPA should redefine the role of 
the Council on Environmental Quality. Although the present 
Administration is loath to expand the role offederal bureaucracy, 
there is a clear need for a strong overseeing body to implement 
NEPA, as evidenced by the confusion and plethora of litigation 
during the past fourteen years over the meaning of the statute. 
400 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. v, 1981). 
407 The arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review was expressly adopted in 
the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. This standard was selected over the sub-
stantial evidence standard by the conferees. 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (Supp. I, 1977). H.R. CoNF. 
REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1977) reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 1559. See National Lime Association V. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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Stronger administration of the procedural requirements ofNEPA 
are necessary in order to fulfill the ultimate goal of NEPA -
environmentally sensitive decision making by federal agencies. 
The CEQ could provide this guidance and ensure agency com-
pliance with these requirements if it were imbued with more than 
vague, advisory powers. 
In essence, NEPA should be drawn more narrowly to prevent 
federal agencies from manipulating and circumventing the stat-
ute through narrow-minded decision making. Congress should 
clarify the duties of federal agencies under NEPA and translate 
the statute's broad environmental policies into more precise pro-
cedural demands. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
NEPA shares many of the characteristics of a charitable trust. 
Like a trust instrument, the statute itself declares, as its trust 
purpose, the goal of preserving and protecting the quality of the 
American natural and physical environment. Congress, as the 
settlor empowered with the legal capacity to create the trust 
document, designated the federal government, through its agen-
cies, to be the trustee of the environment for this purpose. The 
Act is intended to protect the present and future interests of the 
trust beneficiaries, the American citizens. It is incumbent upon 
federal agencies to fulfill their fiduciary duties as trustees owe to 
the beneficiaries in the conduct of any affairs affecting the envi-
ronment. In addition to exercising the reasonable skill, prudence, 
care, and loyalty of a trustee, federal agencies must observe the 
trustee's obligation to account for the trust administration to the 
beneficiaries of the trust. To fulfill this accounting obligation, the 
federal agencies must observe the accounting requirements pro-
vided in the statute, the procedural mandates of the EIS provi-
sion. 
Recognition of the federal agencies' duties as trustees of the 
environment provides the judiciary with a standard by which to 
ensure conscientious compliance with the principles outlined in 
the Act. Judicial interpretation of the statute's broad language is 
necessary to ensure that the protective goals of NEPA are 
fulfilled. In order for the judicial interpretation of NEPA to pro-
vide an effective standard for federal agencies to observe, judicial 
interpretation of the Act must be consistent. The analogy of 
NEPA to the charitable trust affords the courts the opportunity 
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to apply a consistent standard of analysis to issues raised under 
NEPA. 
The principle of trustee accountability to the beneficiaries must 
not be \lndermined by inconsistent requirements regarding the 
recordkeeping of the trust administration. NEPA explicitly 
created the EIS as the procedural mechanism to implement the 
Act's goal of infusing environmental considerations into the fed-
eral agency decision-making process. NEPA requires that the 
EIS contain a complete explanation of the federal agency 
decision-making process. The EIS alone must satisfy the basic 
requirements of statutory compliance. While the administrative 
record compiled in the process of formulating proposed agency 
action is an important reference for the court in assessing the 
thorough compliance by the agency, the discussion of alternatives 
required under Section 102(2)(c)(iii) of NEPA must be sufficiently 
presented in the EIS. 
Finally, judicial review of issues arising under NEPA must be 
conducted under a consistent approach. The trustee is conferred 
with certain duties and a standard of conduct in the exercise of 
his discretion regarding the treatment of the trust property. The 
trustee's activities and decisions should be evaluated under a 
standard of reasonable care. Consequently, judicial evaluation of 
the federal agency compliance with the procedural mandates of 
NEPA should be based upon a "reasonableness" standard requir-
ing a standard of agency behavior commensurate with its 
trustee-like role under the Act. In light of the underlying purpose 
of NEPA - to entrust the quality of the present and future 
environment of the United States to the good faith judgment of 
the federal agencies - a high standard of integrity is appropriate. 
Consistent application of such a standard would provide federal 
agencies with a guideline for complying with NEPA and judicial 
analysis would be far less contrived. Under such an ascertainable 
structure, both the judicial and the administrative branches of 
the federal government would ensure that the American public, 
as beneficiaries of the trust, is provided with a qualitatively ac-
ceptable natural environment. 
